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I. INTRODUCTION
After many years of effort, during the last twenty years artists and their
supporters have convinced several states and the federal government to
adopt European-style statutes protecting art from disfigurement,
modification, or destruction. These so-called moral rights statutes give
visual artists the legal right to protect their work against disfiguring attacks
or, in some cases, total destruction. Moral rights statutes have been widely
supported by members of the art community and their advocates in
legislatures and legal academia. To the extent there has been opposition, it
has come largely from the film and publishing industries, which have
objected to giving writers, screenwriters, and directors moral rights in
books and movies. For this reason, Congress limited the protections
offered by the federal moral rights statute to the non-cinematic aspects
of the visual arts such as painting, drawing, lithography, and so forth.1
Recently, however, opposition to moral rights statutes has arisen from
a new quarter—indeed, from someone whose academic work would
probably locate her within the arts community itself. In a recent article
in the California Law Review, Professor Amy Adler argued that moral
rights statutes are not only unnecessary, they are actually inconsistent
with the nature of contemporary art.2 Professor Adler’s arguments are
therefore based not on the usual property rights or free market claims
1. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006); see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories”:
Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 28 (2001) (“VARA was narrowly crafted in response to the vocal
objections of the motion picture and publishing industries, which were strongly opposed
to the enactment of moral rights protections. During the course of the hearings on
VARA, Congress heard the testimony of artists and film directors speaking on behalf of
a broader coverage for moral rights, and industry executives opposed to such an
extension. As enacted, VARA reflects the voices of the publishers and studio executives
from such powerhouses as Disney and Turner Entertainment who expressed concern
about the ability of their industries to continue to derive profits and remain powerful in
the face of expanded moral rights protections . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
2. See Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (2009).
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against moral rights statutes but rather on detailed claims about the
nature of art and art theory. Specifically, Professor Adler argues that the
nature of art has moved beyond the static, iconographic forms of visual
representation that benefit from the enforcement of moral rights statutes.
According to Professor Adler, protecting the integrity of artistic works
through moral rights statutes “threatens art because it fails to recognize
the profound artistic importance of modifying, even destroying, works of
art, and of freeing art from the control of the artist.”3
This Article is a response to Professor Adler’s perspective on the
value of moral rights statutes, the philosophical background that informs
that perspective, and her argument that the nature of contemporary art
and art theory undermines the case for such statutes. The argument here
is that moral rights statutes are simply irrelevant to much of the
transgressive art that Professor Adler uses as examples to bolster her
arguments against moral rights statutes. Conversely, while moral rights
statutes do little harm, they do a great deal of good. Specifically, moral
rights statutes remain an extremely crucial tool in protecting the work of
artists who work in nontransitory media such as painting, drawing,
lithography, and sculpture.
It is certainly true that the art world has splintered badly since the days
when the abstract expressionists and critics such as Harold Rosenberg
and Clement Greenberg could take it upon themselves to decide for the
entire society what was and was not art.4 This splintering has even led some
in the world of art theory to pronounce the “end of art.”5 But despite this
phenomenon, the destruction of art has hardly become the defining
characteristic of the new art world. For art aficionados, this must be judged

3. Id. at 265.
4. Harold Rosenberg was the art critic for The New Yorker magazine and a
prominent champion of abstract expressionism through books. See, e.g., HAROLD
ROSENBERG, THE TRADITION OF THE NEW (1959). Clement Greenberg was also an early
supporter of abstract expressionism, especially the work of Jackson Pollock. In his later
years, he denounced pop art, conceptual art, and almost all forms of postmodernism. His
attitude toward the work that is being advanced by Professor Adler as embodying the
essence of contemporary art might be intuited from his essay Avant-Garde and Kitsch, in
ART AND CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS 3 (1961). For a somewhat glib but entertaining
critical assessment of Rosenberg’s and Greenberg’s influence on the art world during
their heyday, see TOM WOLFE, THE PAINTED WORD 49–50 (1975), which states that
“[o]ne secret of Greenberg’s and Rosenberg’s astounding success, then, was that they
were not like uptown critics—they were not mere critics: they spoke as the voice of
bohemia . . . and naturally le monde listened.”
5. See infra notes 78–104 and accompanying text.
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a good thing. After all, it stands to reason that the destruction of art
leads inevitably to less art. The protection of art, conversely, leads to the
proliferation of art. This is the simple equation that Professor Adler must
grapple with in arguing against the wisdom of moral rights statutes. Unless
a diminished supply of art would be good for the country’s cultural
legacy, it seems logical to applaud legislative efforts to protect art.
Disputes over the protection of art can be viewed in various ways. On
the one hand, these disputes could be viewed as being guided by a purely
pragmatic calculus. Leaving aside ancillary issues such as the property
rights of art purchasers, the question for proponents of art under the
pragmatic conception should be whether a particular statutory scheme
advances or inhibits the development of a culture that leads to the
production of art. There is another way of addressing these disputes,
however, which is to view them through the prism of competing notions
about the nature of art. This sort of dispute forms the basis of Professor
Adler’s complaints about moral rights statutes. The real problem with
such statutes, according to Professor Adler, is that they are predicated on
an old-fashioned—and presumptively exclusionary and elitist—conception
of the nature of art.6 Although Professor Adler’s article seems to be the
first full-length application of these ideas to moral rights statutes, it is
probably inevitable that an argument such as this would be made sooner
or later. After all, literary and artistic theory has for many years been
characterized by variations on similar themes, which are often lumped
together under the pliant term postmodernism. To anyone who has recently
graduated from a graduate program that focuses on such matters, claims
about the death of the author, the oppressiveness of an author-focused
aesthetics, or the need to deconstruct or reinterpret original pieces of art
in order to create more valid forums of art will seem quite familiar.7
What is different in this case is Professor Adler’s use of related theories
to critique statutes that are the primary sources of legal protection for art.
Suddenly, highly abstract theory becomes quite concrete.
The question is not whether Professor Adler’s observations about the
nature of contemporary art are compelling. The question is: Even if these
observations are compelling, does it matter? It may be that moral rights
statutes can be defended even if we accept many of the premises of the
theories discussed by Professor Adler. This Article will address these
6. Adler, supra note 2, at 265.
7. This is a cottage industry that probably has its origins in Roland Barthes’s
essay Death of the Author, which posits a radical disjunction between the author and his
or her manuscript and suggests that meaning can be injected into a manuscript only by
those who read and interpret that manuscript after it is created. See ROLAND BARTHES,
The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 142, 147–48 (Stephen Heath trans.,
1977).
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issues by critiquing the—for lack of a better term—postmodern conceptions
of art and how those conceptions illuminate the difficult issue of
protecting art at a time when, according to Professor Adler, the destruction
of art has come to define the very nature of art.
II. THE NEW CASE AGAINST MORAL RIGHTS STATUTES
The concept of moral rights took some time to catch on in the United
States, although moral rights have been a fixture of the European legal
landscape since the nineteenth century. In Europe, the effort to protect
artists’ rights in their work can be traced to the Renaissance, when
society began to view the production of art less as a trade and more as a
creative discipline.8 This, in turn, “paved the way for the idea of genius
and to an appreciation of a work of art as a creation of the individual
over tradition, science, or rule.”9 By the late eighteenth century in England
and early nineteenth century in France, courts had begun to recognize
the elements of what would become the legal concept of moral rights.10
In 1928, the legal recognition of an artist’s moral rights was codified by
the addition of Article 6bis to the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention or Convention).11
Article 6bis of the Convention provides that “even after the transfer of
said rights, the author shall have the right to . . . object to any distortion,
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation
to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”12
The concept of moral rights for artists caught on much more slowly in
the United States than in Europe. The first moral rights statutes were
enacted at the state level. California adopted its statute, the California
Art Preservation Act, in 1979.13 After a notorious case in which Frank
Stella was forced to sue a gallery that allegedly removed two discarded
paintings from the landing outside Stella’s studio and then displayed

8. See W.W. Kowalski, A Comparative Law Analysis of the Retained Rights of
Artists, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1143–45 (2005) (discussing early conceptions
of art and artists).
9. Id. at 1144.
10. See id. at 1148–49.
11. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis,
Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
12. Id.
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 2007).
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them without Stella’s permission,14 New York enacted its statute, the
Artists Authorship Rights Act,15 in 1983. A handful of other states passed
similar statutes.
At the federal level, the United States government did not even accede
to the Berne Convention until March 1989.16 After acceding to the
Convention, Congress initially concluded that no further legislation was
necessary to implement Article 6bis.17 Within a year, however, Congress
would join the eleven states that had adopted their own moral rights
statutes by enacting the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA).18 This
statute protects two of the most important aspects of the artist’s moral
rights: the right of attribution and the right of integrity. The right of
attribution gives the artist the right to claim authorship in works that he
or she created19 and to disclaim authorship to works that he or she did
not create,20 and prevents the use of an artist’s name in conjunction with
works that have been distorted, mutilated, or otherwise modified in a
way that would be prejudicial to the artist’s reputation.21 The right of
integrity gives the artist the right to prevent the intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of an artistic work if the modification
would damage the artist’s reputation.22 It also gives the artist the right to
prevent the intentional destruction of a “work of recognized stature.”23
A. The Theory and Justification of Moral Rights Protection
There is very little in the legislative materials supporting VARA that
can be described as a sophisticated justification for the existence of moral
rights laws.24 Frankly, the same can be said of the early academic literature
supporting the protection of moral rights in the United States. One of

14. See Stella v. Mazoh, No. 07585-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 1, 1982), discussed in 2
RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS,
DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 1266 (3d ed. 2005). The lawsuit was eventually settled out of
court, and Stella recovered the paintings and destroyed them. LERNER & BRESLER,
supra, at 1266.
15. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 1984) (enacted 1983 and
amended 1984).
16. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6917.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2006).
20. Id. § 106A(a)(1)(B).
21. Id. § 106A(a)(2).
22. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
23. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
24. See H.R. R EP . N O . 101-514, at 5, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6915 (containing a short, two-paragraph discussion of the statute’s purpose, essentially
reiterating the attribution and integrity portions of the statute itself).
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the most basic questions, for example, is whether moral rights statutes
are intended to protect the private interests of the individual artist or
rather some broader social concern, such as the protection of culture and
cultural artifacts. Many of the early proponents of moral rights protection in
the United States tended to finesse this issue, but to the extent that they
came down on one side or the other, they tended to favor the argument
that moral rights should be protected in order to benefit the larger social
interest in art and culture.
In Martin Roeder’s influential early article supporting the legal
protection of moral rights, for example, the author cited both the individual
and the social rationales for protecting moral rights.25 On the one hand,
Roeder argued that moral rights should be protected in order to defend
the sensitivities of the artists who produce the creative work. When an
artist creates, Roeder noted, “he projects into the world part of his
personality and subjects it to the ravages of public use. There are
possibilities of injury to the creator other than merely economic ones.”26
Roeder viewed the legal protection of this “right to create” as being one
of the basic obligations of a liberal society. “By and large . . . modern
liberal social philosophy and jurisprudence support the view that one of
man’s basic rights is the freedom to create.”27 By the same token, however,
Roeder suggested that in the absence of moral rights protection, “the
interest of society in the integrity of its cultural heritage” also goes
unprotected.28 Thus, we have the essential structure of the doctrine that
Professor Adler later criticizes: the assumption that by protecting the
private interests of the independent individual artist, we simultaneously
will protect the cultural heritage of the nation.29
This assumption is not as evident, however, in later academic efforts
to support legal protection of moral rights. Twenty-six years after the
publication of the Roeder article, in another highly influential article on
the same subject, John H. Merryman subordinated the interests of the
individual artist to the social interest in protecting and preserving art and
culture.30 Merryman argued that moral rights should be legally recognized
25. See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of
Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 558, 578 (1940).
26. Id. at 557.
27. Id. at 558.
28. Id. at 557.
29. See Adler, supra note 2, at 265.
30. See John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 1023 (1976).
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primarily to protect the rights of the viewers of art or to preserve the
culture as a whole. As to the viewers of art, Merryman argued that they
had a right in “seeing, or preserving the opportunity to see, the work as
the artist intended it, undistorted and ‘unimproved’ by the unilateral actions
of others.”31 As to the interests of the rest of the culture, Merryman
argued grandiosely that “[a]rt is an aspect of our present culture and our
history; it helps tell us who we are and where we came from. To revise,
censor, or improve the work of art is to falsify a piece of the culture.”32
According to Merryman, moral rights are not really about protecting
an individual artist’s interest in his or her own work. Rather, “[w]e are
interested in protecting the work of art for public reasons, and the moral
right of the artist is in part a method of providing for private enforcement of
this public interest.”33 Merryman would have us consider the artist as a
kind of cultural private attorney general.
It is fair to say that Merryman’s article was fairly typical of arguments
urging state and federal governments to adopt statutes protecting the
moral rights of artists. At least some of this was an attempt by moral rights
supporters to be politically astute. After all, while it is likely that few
legislators have the slightest interest in protecting the interests of scruffy
artists individually, a fair number of legislators would probably like to
think of themselves as the saviors of our national culture.
In any event, Professor Adler rejects both the individual and the social
arguments for protecting the moral rights of artists. As for protecting the
artists’ individual interests in their own work, Professor Adler argues
that moral rights legislation misconstrues the nature of art by assuming
incorrectly that there is a strong connection between every artist and his
or her work. In Professor Adler’s words, “This view overlooks that the
child/artwork has grown up and left home—that works continue to evolve
over time based on how they are presented and received. It overlooks
that the child/artwork left home because the father sold him/it.”34 But
there is more going on in Professor Adler’s criticism than simply a
recognition that much of the work protected by moral rights statutes has
already been disposed of by the artist. Professor Adler goes on to attack
the very nature of artistic authorship: “[M]oral rights law is premised on
a transitory, albeit deeply powerful notion of artistic authorship: the
romantic myth of the solo genius artist.”35 Professor Adler expresses
doubts whether the romantic vision of the artist was ever true and asserts

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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that even if it were once true, “contemporary artists have been relentlessly
attacking it for at least the last forty years.”36
Professor Adler also rejects the traditional social rationales for moral
rights protection of art, although most of her arguments regarding the
social rationales are actually derived from her rejection of what she calls
“the romantic myth of the solo genius artist.” Professor Adler’s basic
claim with regard to social interest in art is that there is often a conflict
between the social interest in preserving cultural objects and the
individual artist’s interests that are specifically protected by statutes such
as VARA. Professor Adler identifies various manifestations of this conflict.
One such manifestation occurs when an artist destroys his or her work,
thus denying society the benefit of viewing that work in the future.37
Professor Adler notes that if the social interest in preserving cultural
artifacts is the purpose of moral rights, then it is anomalous to give the
individual artist the right in this situation since “the public interest is
served by saving the paintings, contrary to the artist’s wishes.”38 This
and the other manifestations of the conflict between the public interest
and the individual artist’s interests cited by Professor Adler are narrower
and more pragmatic than her much more theoretical rejection of the
traditional arguments favoring moral rights statutes in order to protect the
artist’s individual interests. I will return in Part III to Professor Adler’s
theoretical arguments regarding the nature of contemporary art and the
individual artist’s interests after briefly discussing her other narrower,
pragmatic objections to the general social interest in moral rights
protection.
B. The Pragmatic Objections to Moral Rights
Professor Adler’s basic claim with regard to the social rationales for
moral rights statutes is that such rationales do not justify the protections
offered by the statutes because there is an inevitable conflict between the
social interest in creating, displaying, or preserving art and the selfish
individual interests of artists who are given complete control over their
work by moral rights statutes. Leaving aside for the time being the
example of the artist’s destroying his or her own work—which was

36.
37.
38.

Id. at 271–72.
See id. at 273.
Id.
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discussed briefly at the end of Part II.A39—it is worth considering in
greater detail each of Professor Adler’s other suggested manifestations
of the conflict between individual artists and the social interest. Note again
while reviewing these arguments that they do not depend on a
postmodern or otherwise novel conception of artistic authorship. These
are purely pragmatic arguments, which depend on the veracity of the
claims that the social interest in creating and preserving artistic artifacts
will be harmed if individual artists are given the legal right to protect the
integrity of their work.
1. Society’s Interest in Destroying Art
Apart from the example of the artist’s destruction of his or her own
work, the first manifestation of the conflict between society’s and the
individual artist’s interest in art discussed by Professor Adler is society’s
interest in destroying artwork that the artist wants to preserve.40 The
example she uses to illustrate this manifestation of the conflict is the
case of Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc.41 This case provides critics of the
protection of art under moral rights principles with an easy target. Tilted
Arc was a sculpture installed outside a federal building in New York
City. The work was large, abstract, and imposing—in both the sense
that it was grand and stately and the sense that it aggressively thrust itself on
observers. As Professor Adler notes, many people disliked the sculpture,42
and the federal government eventually decided to cut the sculpture up
into large pieces before removing it to a storehouse in Brooklyn, far
away from the space for which it was designed.43
The reason that the Tilted Arc case is an easy target is because of the
public and site-specific nature of the sculpture. To an average person, it
is one thing to say that an artist has a right to protect work in the abstract,
but it is quite another thing to say that the artist has the right to insist that
the owner of an office building keep a 120-foot-long sculpture in place
essentially indefinitely—even in the face of widespread discontent by the
people who work in the building. But there are several problems with
making Tilted Arc a representative case for the proposition that the law
should recognize society’s occasional desire to destroy significant artwork.
First of all, although the Tilted Arc case was litigated before VARA was

39. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
40. Adler, supra note 2, at 274.
41. Id.; see Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988).
42. Adler, supra note 2, at 274 (“[I]t is fair to say that many, many people detested
Tilted Arc.”).
43. Richard Serra, Tilted Arc Destroyed, in WRITINGS, INTERVIEWS 193, 194 (1994)
(describing the destruction of Tilted Arc).
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enacted, that fact probably did not make any difference in the outcome of
the case. As Professor Adler recognizes, it is highly unlikely that any of
the moral rights statutes on the books today would have protected Serra’s
ability to force the government to keep Tilted Arc in the courtyard of the
federal building.44 As Professor Adler notes, Serra would likely lose
either under cases that interpret the statutes as not covering relocation or
under cases that decline to apply VARA to site-specific art.45 So to the
extent that we are debating moral rights in the context of the public’s right
to use public spaces unimpeded by massive pieces of site-specific, intrusive
art, the courts have essentially already decided this matter against the artist.
But Professor Adler is asserting a much broader claim than is evident
from her immediate focus on large, intrusive sculptures in public spaces,
such as Tilted Arc. She is arguing much more broadly that “the public
interest may sometimes lie in the destruction of art, even when the artist
favors preservation.”46 On the assumption that the public interest will
usually be represented by the government, which—in this country at
least—often responds to lowest-common-denominator pressure
from the population when it comes to controversial art,47 Professor Adler’s
proposal would essentially enshrine in law a kind of officially enforced
heckler’s veto. Professor Adler’s discussion of the artistic value of
destroying art, which she at times subsumes into the public interest in
destroying art, is addressed further in Part III. But if we leave aside for
the moment particular artists’ interest in destroying other artists’ art48 and
focus rather on the interest of the general public and its political
representatives, Professor Adler’s proposal leaves us with several unsavory
possibilities.
One possibility is that art could be destroyed at the behest of a general
public that neither knows nor cares about the subject. The other is that
art could be destroyed by politicians pursuing a religious or political
agenda against contentious art. This is only a small step from the
actions already taken by politicians such as Rudy Giuliani against
cultural institutions49 that had the temerity to display art that offended
44. See Adler, supra note 2, at 274 & n.62.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 274.
47. For several examples of this phenomenon, see infra note 49.
48. See infra notes 105–17 and accompanying text.
49. See Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184,
186 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (issuing a preliminary injunction on the grounds that it would be
unconstitutional for the Mayor and City of New York to withdraw funding and eject the
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his—or his political supporters’—religious and political sensibilities.50
The third and most unsavory possibility is that art could be destroyed by
politicians seeking to use the art for ulterior purposes, in the way that the
Nazis used shows of Entartete Kunst, or “degenerate art,” as a way of
targeting Jews, leftists, and other political and cultural opponents.51 If
we are concerned with the public interest in preserving and perpetuating a
cultural legacy, it is difficult to see how the destruction of art will ever
serve that interest, and it is equally easy to see how encouraging the
destruction of art is likely to severely damage that interest.
One final point about Professor Adler’s arguments favoring the
destruction of art as a social interest: Recall that Professor Adler’s first
argument regarding what she calls “the conflict between artist and public”52
and the “myth of the artist”53 that apparently perpetuates this conflict is
that artists should not be allowed to destroy their own work because

Brooklyn Museum from its city-owned building after then-Mayor Rudy Giuliani found
artwork in a museum show “sick,” “disgusting,” and offensive to Catholics and religion
in general). This is hardly the only episode in which politicians have stooped to curry
public favor by attacking a cultural institution or attempting to destroy art for political
reasons. See, e.g., Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
several city aldermen violated the constitutional rights of an art student when the
aldermen removed the student’s painting from the walls of the Art Institute of Chicago
because they found offensive the painting’s depiction of Mayor Harold Washington);
Cuban Museum of Arts & Culture, Inc. v. City of Miami, 766 F. Supp. 1121, 1125–26
(S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding unconstitutional Miami’s refusal to renew the lease for the
Cuban Museum because of local opposition to the museum’s showing the work of artists
who had not denounced Fidel Castro).
50. It should be noted that this is essentially Richard Serra’s interpretation of the
government’s decision to destroy his sculpture. See Richard Serra, Art and Censorship,
in WRITINGS, INTERVIEWS, supra note 43, at 215, 218 (“All of [former New York Times
art critic Hilton] Kramer’s statements concerning my intentions and the effect of the
sculpture are fabricated so that he can place the blame on me for having violated an
equally fabricated standard of civility. Tilted Arc was not destroyed because the
sculpture was uncivil but because the government wanted to set a precedent in which it
could demonstrate its right to censor and destroy speech.”). Serra also notes that the
Tilted Arc episode occurred during a period when other political attacks on art and the
arts were rife, citing the attacks on the National Endowment for the Arts, Robert
Mapplethorpe, and Andres Serrano. See Interview with Richard Serra, in WRITINGS,
INTERVIEWS, supra note 43, at 263, 269.
51. See George L. Mosse, Beauty Without Sensuality: The Exhibition Entartete
Kunst, in “DEGENERATE ART”: THE FATE OF THE AVANT-GARDE IN NAZI GERMANY 25,
25 (1991) (discussing the politicization of art in Nazi Germany, noting that the Nazis
viewed Weimar culture as “‘Bolshevist’ culture, manipulated by the Jews,” and arguing
that confiscating and displaying the “degenerate” art that represented Weimar provided
“concrete evidence that the Nazis had saved German society from Weimar’s onslaught
upon all the moral values that people held dear: marriage, the family, chastity, and a
steady, harmonious life”).
52. Adler, supra note 2, at 273.
53. Id.
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society may have an interest in preserving that artwork.54 She then turns
quickly to her primary argument, which is that artists should not be given
the legal authority to preserve the integrity of their work because society
may have an interest in destroying that work.55 But if an artist lacks the
absolute authority to destroy his or her work and also lacks the authority
to preserve that work, then it is hard to know what to make of the social
interest in overriding these decisions by the artist because there is apparently
an equally strong social interest in both destroying and preserving art,
depending on the whims of those enforcing the social interest.
What we must take away from this discussion is the uneasy recognition
that under this scheme, control over art has suddenly shifted from artists
to some collective entity other than artists. This is a disturbing shift
because this approach gives us no way of controlling the aesthetic
criteria—or lack thereof—employed by the collective entities that would
now have the authority to exercise control over the preservation of art.
Consider the possible representatives of the social interest: the government,
which is systematically prone to viewing art through the lens of political
or religious ideology; the general public, which is largely uneducated on
matters of art and aesthetics and is prone to being guided in its approach
to art by some variation on the proposition that “I know what I like”; or
gallery owners and rich patrons, who have a vested economic interest
that as often as not will deviate sharply from a purely abstract concern
with artistic merit or the broader cultural heritage. Something will be
preserved under this system, but it is unlikely to be the best art.
2. Society’s Interest in Favoring Curatorial Decisions About Art
A second manifestation of the conflict between the individual artist’s
desires and the public interest cited by Professor Adler adds to the concern
that in the absence of moral rights statutes artistic works will be vulnerable
to every political and cultural fad and fixation. Professor Adler refers to
this manifestation as “The Curator as Artist.”56 Professor Adler’s narrow
point is to argue that curators of galleries and museums do—and should—
manipulate the meaning of art through the display of that art, which

54. Id. (“[T]here are cases in which artists want to destroy work that the public
arguably has an interest in preserving.”).
55. See id. at 274 (“[T]he public interest may sometimes lie in the destruction of
art, even when the artist favors preservation.”).
56. Id. at 277.
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individual artists should not be allowed to control. Professor Adler’s larger
point is that all art is capable of conveying multiple meanings, and the
artist’s intent about a particular work’s meaning should not be allowed
to “hold the work hostage from other meanings or interpretations.”57
This follows Professor Adler’s general theme that the proponents of moral
rights statutes are misguided when they seek to enshrine in law protection
of the artist’s own intentions about the meaning of his or her work.
The basic proposition that all works of art can convey multiple
meanings is a perfectly respectable position; in fact, this proposition is
so obviously true that it does not need defending. Every observer of a
piece of art will take away from that art something different than what the
artist saw in the same piece. This basic precept about the nature of art
and observation is not really relevant to the subject of moral rights,
however. In the context of moral rights statutes, we are not discussing
the ability of multiple observers to view art and take away from that art
different meanings. Rather, we are discussing the possibility of removing
from the artist the power to attempt to convey his or her own artistic
meaning and transferring that power to someone who may very well be
hostile to the artist’s own perspective.
The primary example that Professor Adler uses to illustrate this
manifestation of the conflict between artists and society is a perfect case
in point. The example involves a dispute between the artist Sol Lewitt
and Elizabeth Broun, director of the National Museum of American Art,
to which Lewitt had contributed a piece of art in conjunction with an
exhibition centering on the work of photographer Eadweard Muybridge.58
Lewitt’s contribution included “a series of ten photographs of a fully
nude woman advanc[ing] toward the viewer, who sees her through a
series of circular apertures.” 59 Broun was offended by Lewitt’s work
and decided to exclude it from the show on the ground that “peering
through successive peep-holes and focusing increasingly on the pubic
region invokes unequivocal references to a degrading pornographic
experience.”60 Broun backed down from her threat to exclude Lewitt’s
work after the Addison Gallery of American Art, which had organized
the original show, threatened to withdraw the show from the National
Museum of American Art.61 Although she allowed Lewitt’s work to remain
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 278.
Id.
MICHAEL KAMMEN, VISUAL SHOCK: A HISTORY OF ART CONTROVERSIES IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 83 (2006).
60. Id. (quoting Christine Temin, Art Work Installed After Director Balks, BOS.
GLOBE, July 16, 1991, at 51, available at 1991 WLNR 1764313) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
61. Id. at 83–84.
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in the show, however, as Professor Adler notes, Broun “proposed to move it
to a separate room with wall text explaining the issue and a blank book for
visitors to record their thoughts.”62
Although she disagrees with Broun’s prim reading of Lewitt’s work,
Professor Adler defends Broun’s use of her curatorial prerogatives to
display the work in a way that would fundamentally alter the message
the artist intended to convey. To Professor Adler, this is a worthwhile
example of a curator’s using existing art as the raw material with which
to make new—and entirely different—art: “Rather than see such change
as a violation of the spirit if not the letter of the law, we should see it as
commitment to the vitality of art.”63 But recall that Professor Adler’s
larger point is that destruction of existing art is sometimes artistically
and socially beneficial. 64 In light of that larger theme, the Sol Lewitt
episode presents too easy a case. After all, although Lewitt was essentially
called a pornographer in public and his work was labeled pornographic,
the work was not harmed, much less destroyed.
But suppose the facts were changed slightly. Suppose the museum
went beyond merely relegating the disfavored art into a separate room
and having patrons comment on it. The Museum of Modern Art (MoMA)
owns one of Picasso’s best and most important paintings—Les Demoiselles
d’Avignon.65 The painting is a stylized depiction of five nude prostitutes
in a brothel in Barcelona.66 Suppose that at some point a MoMA curator
in the vein of Elizabeth Broun concludes that the devil “invokes unequivocal
references to a degrading pornographic experience.”67 Suppose further
that instead of relegating the painting to a side room, however, she decides
to fix the offending portions of the painting by hiring a painter to paint
clothes on the figures, paint smiles on their faces, and insert the figures
of three small, happy children playing in the foreground. This example
is far more apropos than the Sol Lewitt episode to Professor Adler’s
overriding theme that artistic destruction should be encouraged to promote

62. Adler, supra note 2, at 278.
63. Id. at 278–79.
64. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
65. The MoMA’s catalog of its most important holdings describes this painting
self-servingly—but also probably accurately—as “one of the most important works in
the genesis of modern art.” THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, MOMA HIGHLIGHTS: 350
WORKS FROM THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART NEW YORK 64 (Harriet Schoenholz Bee &
Cassandra Heliczer eds., 2004).
66. Id.
67. KAMMEN, supra note 59, at 83.
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artistic creation. One wonders, therefore, whether she would consider
the hypothetical destruction of Les Demoiselles an example of our
“commitment to the vitality of art.”68
3. Society’s Interest in Allowing Others To Modify an Artist’s Work
Professor Adler’s last two manifestations of the conflict between the
social interest and individual artists can be dealt with quickly. One of
these manifestations involves situations in which an artist’s work may be
improved by others who violate the artist’s interests by modifying the
artist’s work.69 Professor Adler cites the famous example of the critic
Clement Greenberg’s destroying the painted surfaces of sculptures produced
by David Smith.70 Greenberg did this as the executor of Smith’s estate,
and as Professor Adler notes, the actions were directly contrary to Smith’s
desires, and Smith would almost certainly have disowned the sculptures
if he were still alive.71 Professor Adler nevertheless argues that what
could plausibly be construed as vandalism made Smith’s sculptures
“better,” at least in the sense that collectors, museums, and galleries prefer
the vandalized, unpainted sculptures to the original, painted ones.
In fact, the Greenberg/Smith episode proves much less than Professor
Adler indicates. Instead of demonstrating that artists’ work should be
freely subject to modifications by others in the interest of conforming an
idiosyncratic individual artist’s vision to the contrary vision of society as
a whole, all this example proves is that the high-profile modification of a
prominent artist’s work will make the vandalized work notorious, which
will have the bizarre effect of increasing that work’s value on the market
and thereby make the work more precious to collectors and museums. As
Professor Adler herself notes, the market value of a painting is no
indicator of artistic merit.72 In the situation described by Professor Adler,
there are only two possible outcomes: either the artist has the legal right
to stop other persons from modifying the art, or those other persons have
the legal right to modify art against the artist’s wishes. In a world in which
the aesthetic values that inform the appellation better are at least
debatable, there is no good reason to assume that persons other than the
artist will have a better grasp on what is “better” than the artist herself.

68. Adler, supra note 2, at 279. The answer to this question is probably “yes,”
given her approach to the Chapman brothers’ work, which is discussed infra notes 105–
17 and accompanying text.
69. See Adler, supra note 2, at 275.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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4. Society’s Interest in Recognizing Multiple Authorship
Professor Adler’s final manifestation of the conflict between the social
interests in art and the interests of individual artists involves cases where
multiple persons contribute to an artist’s work.73 Such situations actually
have very little to do with issues pertaining to moral rights. While interesting
questions of authorship might arise from the work of individuals such as
Damien Hirst and Jeff Koons, who farm out to others the actual production
of art that they then claim as their own,74 in many cases artists actually
produce their own work. Even artists who produce their own work,
however, do not operate in a vacuum; influences from their training and
personal experiences, as well as other people—including other artists—
will all factor into the substance of their work. The fact that artists are
influenced by the outside world and other artists says nothing about whether
those artists should have the legal right to protect their work from
desecration or destruction.
Many collaborations in the visual arts world are analogous to the
Eliot/Pound collaboration in the literary arts. Probably the greatest example
of extremely close artistic collaboration between visual artists in the modern
art era is that between Pablo Picasso and George Braque during the heyday
of analytic cubism.75 Many of the paintings produced by the two men
during that period are indistinguishable to the untrained eye. Much more
so than the work of Eliot and Pound, Picasso’s analytic cubist paintings
were Braque’s, and Braque’s paintings were Picasso’s. Yet both Picasso
and Braque had very distinctive ideas about the nature of what they were
doing, and ultimately they took the legacy of analytic cubism in very
different directions. If Picasso’s and Braque’s analytic cubist works are
viewed as merely small portions of two long, rich, and interesting—and

73. Professor Adler cites as an example from literary arts Ezra Pound’s contributions to
T.S. Eliot’s poem The Waste Land. Id. at 276.
74. See Denis Dutton, Has Conceptual Art Jumped the Shark Tank?, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 2009, at A27 (discussing the fact that Hirst and Koons hire contractors who
actually produce the art that the artists call their own). Unfortunately, the economic
downturn has been hard on the artists behind the “artists.” Damien Hirst, for example,
recently dismissed several workers who make the pills for the medicine cabinets that
Hirst markets as art. One such cabinet filled with pills sold for $14.4 million in 2007.
See Dave Itzkoff, Hirst Studio Hard Times, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at C2.
75. See Rosalind Krauss, The Motivation of the Sign, in PICASSO AND BRAQUE:
A SYMPOSIUM 261, 270 (Lynn Zelevansky ed., 1992) (noting that although there were
subtle stylistic differences between the two artists, there was a period during which “the
work of the two [wa]s all but indistinguishable”).
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very different—careers, then paintings whose authorship is almost
indecipherable look less like collaborations and more like the brief
intersection of two paths going in very different directions. It seems
self-evident, therefore, that both artists’ work should be protected. Certainly
one artist—much less the gallery owners and collectors—should not
be given the right to modify or destroy the other artist’s work in order to
favor one version of the trajectory of analytic cubism over another. If
society’s interests and the need to preserve a cultural heritage are what
we are worried about, then it has to be said that neither Braque nor
Picasso had a more socially beneficial aesthetic, and the proper decision
would be to preserve both of their legacies.
5. The Failure of Pragmatic Arguments Against Moral Rights
At the end of the day, pragmatic arguments such as the ones discussed
above do not undercut the case for a social interest in providing moral
rights protection to artists. None of the arguments Professor Adler musters
in describing the four manifestations of the conflict between an
individual artist and the larger social interest supports the existence of
such a conflict, much less supports the existence of a conflict that should
be resolved in favor of giving control over artwork to someone other
than the artist. Moreover, the implicit proposals that can be found in this
discussion—in particular, the eradication of moral rights protections—
would almost certainly lead to a diminution in the overall amount of art
available in the culture. After all, it seems logical to assume that less
protection of art means that more art will be destroyed. Perhaps this is
not something that would particularly bother Professor Adler; in fact,
facilitating the destruction of art as an artistic enterprise is the very heart
of her proposal.
But the key point is that despite her best efforts, Professor Adler has
not demonstrated that there is any real pragmatic issue with moral rights
statutes. There is something much deeper at issue here than pragmatic
claims about the conflict between the social interest in art and the operation
of moral rights statutes. Professor Adler’s main target, rather, is the very
concepts of art and the artist. Professor Adler is not particularly concerned
that moral rights statutes do not always protect the art that is the
justification for the statutes’ existence because Professor Adler is not
convinced that the art is worth protecting or, for that matter, that the thing
being protected should even be called art. Professor Adler’s claims against
moral rights statutes are really claims about the nature of art that these
statutes protect. This is why, despite paying lip service to the subject,
Professor Adler is not really concerned with the social-interest justifications
for moral rights statutes; the object of her focus instead is with the
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individual artist’s interests, the protection of which is a significant
justification for the statutes. Professor Adler is concerned not so much
that the statutory protection given to these individual artists is going to
somehow undermine the social interest in art and culture but rather that
the statutory protection of individual artists will perpetuate the recognition
of entities—art and artists—that do not, or should not, exist. Professor
Adler’s main problem with these statutes, in other words, is that they are
predicated on the vision of the individual Romantic artist—and the
conception of art that attaches to such an artist.
Part III will delve into these different conceptions of art as they apply
to moral rights statutes. The issues discussed in Part III can be phrased
in various ways. First, if contemporary art theory effectively denies that
art exists and therefore has killed off the artist, then why do we need art
protection measures, such as moral rights statutes? On the other hand,
coming at the same question from another direction, if we kill off legal
measures to protect art, such as moral rights statutes, does that not send a
message from the culture that art really does not exist—or is not at all
important—and that artists should be advised to drop their brushes or
their sculpting tools and focus on their day jobs? And finally, even if the
world of contemporary art and art theory is exactly as Professor Adler
describes, does it really matter with respect to the continuing viability of
moral rights statutes? Even if something can no longer be called art, is it
not perhaps still worthwhile to preserve aesthetically pleasing objects?
III. MORAL RIGHTS AND THE END OF ART: THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN ART THEORY AND THE LAW REGARDING ART
Professor Adler views her criticism of moral rights statutes to be
nothing less than an explicit challenge to the theoretical basis of these
statutes, which Professor Adler believes is inconsistent with the nature
of contemporary art and art theory.76 Although Professor Adler casts her
criticism of the theory underpinning moral rights statutes as an effort to
advance the cause of art, acceptance of her criticism would in fact permit
the destruction or desecration of some art and thus lead to at least a
slight diminution in the quantum of art available to the culture. It would
also, at least in some measure, distort the art world by favoring some
forms of art—conceptual art, derivative art, performance art, and other
76. See Adler, supra note 2, at 265 (noting that her article “challenges the key
assumptions of virtually all moral rights scholarship”).

55

art produced in nontraditional modes—over other forms of art, especially art
produced in traditional media such as sculpture, painting, photography, and
drawing. Acceptance of these concepts would also distort the art world
through the adoption of a corrosive view of what constitutes art. According
to this view, original art produced in a traditional medium by an individual
artist would become the fodder for—and therefore become subordinated
to—conceptual and other nontraditional forms of art. Although newer
forms of art would receive society’s recognition, if not society’s protection,
under this theory—legal protection would disappear because moral
rights statutes would no longer be necessary—art that does not conform
to these new notions of art would lose not only society’s protection but
also society’s recognition.
In exchange for permitting this attack on art, the culture would receive
little or nothing of artistic value—or at least little or nothing in addition
to what society would already be provided by artists in the absence of de
facto legal authorization of artistic destruction or desecration. Professor
Adler is essentially proposing a tradeoff. The tradeoff would officially
permit the destruction or desecration of some art, including some important
art, in exchange for the production of new art that would be based—often
physically—on the carcass of the old. It is the premise of this Article
that the tradeoff suggested by Professor Adler is a bad one, both because
her theory of art is flawed and because, pragmatically speaking, every
piece of new art that she implicitly promises under her proposed regime
will be delivered anyway regardless of whether moral rights statutes and
other legal protections of existing art are in place. Part III will focus on
Professor Adler’s theory of art, and Part IV will focus on the pragmatic
consequences of that theory in terms of artistic productivity.
A. The End of Art or the Proliferation of Art?
The notion that moral rights statutes are incompatible with the dominant
contemporary definition of art is central to Professor Adler’s argument.77
According to Professor Adler, it is not just that traditional definitions of
art are inconsistent with contemporary conceptions of art; rather, it seems
that contemporary artistic practices have moved so far beyond the
traditional definitions that any attempt to define art would be inconsistent
with contemporary conceptions about the subject. Professor Adler
highlights this fact at the very beginning of her article, when she provides
the broad definition of art that she uses as the basis for her criticism of
moral rights statutes and the types of art that those statutes protect:

77.
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I use the term “art” to describe work that critics, scholars, galleries, museums,
and “artists” generally discuss as “art.” But I also use the term “art” to include
works that make us ask the question “what is art?” in the first place. By using
the term so broadly, I mean to illustrate a central point of this piece: attacks by
“artists” on the category of “art” have at once constituted and begun to destroy
the meaning of that term.78

As this passage indicates, Professor Adler’s criticism of the statutory
protection of art is predicated partly on the notion that there is no longer
any such thing as art and therefore the protection of art is unnecessary.
In her view, the exponential expansion of the category of art ultimately
leads to the disintegration of that category. If everything is art, then
nothing is art.
On the other hand, in other places Professor Adler reveals that her
claims about the impending demise of art are not radical contentions
about a vaunted historical category of intellectual endeavor but rather
much more mundane and tendentious arguments in favor of one type of
art and against another. After noting that contemporary art has been defined
by “its attack on the coherence of ‘art’ as a category,”79 for example,
Professor Adler goes on to assert that “[i]n this light, physical attacks
against art objects can be understood as particularly valuable forms of
expression.”80
These are, of course, very different claims. If indeed the category of
“art” no longer makes any sense, the solution is simple: shut down the
entire enterprise by refusing to recognize its legitimacy, close the art
schools, stop trying to find patrons to populate the galleries in Chelsea
on weekends, and let Roberta Smith—The New York Times chief art
critic—move on to doing something productive with her time, such
as reviewing movies. On the other hand, if the claim is that some
contemporary artists attack the coherence of “art” because they prefer to
use “physical attacks against art objects” as their métier, then the claim
must be viewed as a much more contestable pitch for one type of art
against another. Instead of an argument that art no longer exists, it is an
argument that some types of art are better than others. It is an argument,
in other words, in favor of art that is conceptual rather than visual,
derivative or even parasitic rather than original (in the sense that it feeds
off of other destroyed works), and impermanent—or faddish, depending

78.
79.
80.

Id. at 266.
Id. at 287.
Id.
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on the attitude one wants to take toward the work. A case can be made
that some of the work produced in the conceptual genre is very good. It
is also possible to attempt to make the case that art of this type is superior
artistically to art that has been produced in a more traditional form. But
the case for the artistic superiority of conceptual or postmodernist art or
some variation of that theme will not logically support a frontal attack
on a regime of legal protection for moral rights, nor will it support the
claim that artists operating in category B have the right to advance their
artistic ambitions by destroying the work of artists operating in category
A.
Professor Adler is not alone in suggesting that art has become so
unmoored from its origins that the term essentially has become meaningless.
As she points out, there are numerous artists, critics, and art theorists
who agree with her.81 There are many postmodernist critics and theorists
who argue, like Professor Adler, that art no longer can be meaningfully
defined and that we should abandon the category of art altogether. Take,
for example, the philosopher and art critic Arthur Danto, whom Adler
herself describes as “renowned.”82 Several years ago, Danto wrote a
famous essay in which he proclaimed “the end of art.”83 This essay
provides a philosophic overlay for the claims being made by Professor
Adler. Although Professor Danto has somewhat different emphases than
Professor Adler, they are both talking about much of the same
phenomenon: the end of art and what comes after.
Danto and Adler come at this question from the same angle. Like
Adler—and for that matter Hegel, from whom Danto takes his cue—
Danto argues that “the concept of art is internally exhausted” and that art
has “lost any historical direction.”84 But Danto goes far deeper into the
subject of why this is so and therefore provides the back story to the
various claims that Professor Adler makes in her article concerning the
need to abandon the traditional definitions of art and society’s fixation
on the romantic artist. The story Danto tells is quite straightforward.
Put simply, in his view, the history of art is about what he calls the
Western “pursuit of optical fidelity.”85 In other words, until very recently
art was an effort to achieve the exact replication of reality; it was thus
largely indistinguishable from the natural sciences, in that both disciplines
“could then be read as the progressive shrinking of the distance between
81. See, for example, id. at 285–86, for a selection of quotes from critics and
artists supporting Professor Adler’s position.
82. Id. at 285.
83. See Arthur C. Danto, The End of Art, in THE DEATH OF ART 5 (Berel Lang ed.,
1984).
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id. at 13.
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representation and reality.”86 Thus, for many years artists devoted much
of their attention to developing techniques to mimic motion or distance.87
With the discovery of perspective and the development of photography
and, much later, motion pictures, each of which greatly advanced “[t]he
cultural imperative to replace inference with direct perception,”88 art
may have in effect doomed itself, at least from the perspective of this
particular view of art as a progressive, mimetic discipline. “When, for
every perception range R, an equivalent could be technically generated,
then art would be over with just as science would be over with when, as
was thought to be a genuine possibility in the nineteenth century, everything
was known.”89
Danto argues that this progressive model of art has not prevailed for
some time—probably since the early twentieth century, when cinema
took over art’s representational obligations. But the alternative models
of art that he suggests hold out no more hope than that the representational
model of art can survive as a coherent intellectual phenomenon. The model
that Danto argues gained prominence in the early twentieth century no
longer was marked “by the artist’s mastery of illusionist technique, but
rather consist[ed] in the externalization or objectification of the artist’s
feelings toward what he shows.”90 Thus, Danto argues, the art world moved
from a regime focused on representation to a regime focused on
expression. 91 This transition altered the artistic landscape in a
fundamental way. One consequence of such a transition, according to
Danto, is the abandonment of the notion of artistic progression.92 Within
the visually oriented representation model of art, there is a sense of constant
progression as artists discovered increasingly sophisticated ways to depict
reality accurately. The new expressive model of art, on the other hand,
“makes possible a radically discontinuous view of the history of art, in
which one style of art follows another, like an archipelago, and we might
in principle imagine any sequence we choose.”93
Unfortunately, according to Danto, this model also proved unsatisfactory,
in large part because each new artistic movement in the twentieth century
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 9.
See id. at 10.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 23.
See id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 25.
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“seemed to require some kind of theoretical understanding to which the
language and the psychology of emotions seemed less and less adequate.”94
So in place of the outdated representational model and the inadequate
expressive model, Danto proposes to install a philosophical model of art.95
Danto believes that this model will both explain the increasingly fractured
forms that artistic objects take in the modern world and also explain why
art as a subject has pretty much reached the end of its tether. The theme of
the philosophical model draws again on Hegel and in particular on
Hegel’s emphasis on self-realization through self-knowledge. In the
context of art, this means that “[i]t is possible to read Hegel as claiming
that art’s philosophical history consists in its being absorbed completely
into its own philosophy.”96 From this point it is not difficult to glimpse
how the end of art comes about. “[I]f we look at the art of our recent past in
these terms, grandiose as they are, what we see is something which depends
more and more upon theory for its existence as art . . . .”97 The culmination
of the process is inevitable: “Virtually all there is at the end is theory, art
having finally become vaporized in a dazzle of pure thought about itself.”98
So here, according to Danto, is how art ends, and what the art world
will look like after its demise:
Of course, there will go on being art-making. But art-makers, living in what I
like to call the post-historical period of art, will bring into existence works
which lack the historical importance or meaning we have for a very long time
come to expect. The historical stage of art is done with when it is known what
art is and means. The artists have made the way open for philosophy, and the
moment has arrived at which the task must be transferred finally into the hands
of philosophers.99

This long digression into end-of-art theory has been necessary because
the paragraph just quoted provides the nub of Professor Adler’s critique
of moral rights statutes. Although Professor Adler may not agree with
all of the finer points of Professor Danto’s critique of the history of art,
her bottom line is certainly the same: art—at least art that focuses on
exploring human perceptions and utilizes the visual media—is dead. In
place of the now-dead visual art, we have only conceptual art, and in
place of painters, sculptors, lithographers, and so forth, we have a new
batch of conceptual artists, on whom Danto has generously bestowed the
title philosopher.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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One of the many paradoxes of this account is that after the end of art,
art, of some sort, will survive. Danto joins Hegel in asserting that art “is
quite finished with as an historical moment,” but Danto emphasizes that
after proclaiming art dead, Hegel “did not commit himself to the
prediction that there would be no more works of art.”100 This paradox is
also at the heart of Professor Adler’s claims regarding contemporary art,
insofar as she simultaneously claims, on the one hand, that the era of art
and the individual artist is over and, on the other hand, that the destruction
of art is necessary because it will lead to the creation of more art.
Within the context of his philosophy, Hegel’s version of this argument at
least has a certain internal logic because he was viewing art through a
philosophical and historical lens that required art to serve a particular
historical function. In the Hegelian system of thinking about these things,
once art ceases to serve its designated historical function, art must be
declared dead.
The problem with Professor Adler’s versions of this argument, however,
is that she cannot resort to the overlay of Hegelian historical determinism.
She is viewing the matter not through history but purely through the lens
of art itself. Her claim is nothing less than that the art that will be
produced in the new, post-art era will be better than the art produced in
prior eras.101 This, in part, explains the logic of Professor Adler’s argument
that the law should permit conceptual artists to destroy art from previous
eras in order to create their new work.102 Unlike Hegel, therefore,
Professor Adler is making a purely aesthetic claim. The problem is that
on the way to making this claim she has effectively killed off aesthetics
by announcing that art as a visual endeavor has been forced to cede the
stage to conceptual art. After all, it is hard to find aesthetic criteria that
will apply easily to art that as a matter of principle eschews the visual
focus. Note that this abandonment of aesthetics is entirely consistent
with the attitude adopted by the conceptualist hero Marcel Duchamp,
who liked to claim that he produced work that could not be “‘looked at’
in an aesthetic sense.”103 Duchamp also liked to describe himself as
100. Id. at 6.
101. This is what I assume Professor Adler means when she argues that “there are
vital artistic interests, not merely social or political ones, in altering, vandalizing or even
destroying unique works.” See Adler, supra note 2, at 281.
102. See id. at 281–82 (applying this theory to the defacing of rare Goya prints by
the Chapman brothers).
103. PIERRE CABANNE, DIALOGUES WITH MARCEL DUCHAMP 43 (Ron Padgett trans.,
1971).
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having an “antiretinal attitude,” complaining that since at least the 1800s,
painting had been addressed to the eye, thus abandoning painting’s other
functions—religious, philosophical, and moral.104
The end-of-art thesis ultimately suggests a large number of questions
for which it provides very few answers. As it relates to Professor
Adler’s argument against art-protection statutes, the two most important
propositions of her theory are the following. First, both Professor Danto
and Professor Adler assert (in Danto’s case) or suggest (in Adler’s case)
that art as a purely visual medium has nothing more to contribute to our
cultural life. For both Danto and Adler—and for that matter, Duchamp
—the visual has been supplanted by the conceptual. The second proposition
is that conceptual artists have something so vital to contribute to the
culture that we should afford them the right to use, desecrate, or destroy
cultural artifacts in the making of their own work. It is by no means
obvious that either of these two propositions is true—first, that the visual
arts are quaint anachronisms and, second, that conceptual art has become
the only true and worthwhile art—much less that they are so
incontrovertibly true that they should be used as the basis for
undercutting statutes designed to protect visually oriented art from those
who would destroy it. To investigate what merit can be found in these
two central precepts of the end-of-art thesis, it is helpful to return to
Professor Adler’s contention that destruction is critical to the creation of
contemporary art.
B. The End of Art and Destruction-as-Artistic-Creation
So how does Professor Adler’s destruction-as-artistic-creation
paradigm fit into the end-of-art thesis? Professor Adler devotes a great
deal of time to arguing that there is an artistically distinct value in the
destruction of original pieces of art.105 Indeed, this is the core of her
argument against VARA and other moral rights statutes. This is probably a
logical necessity because without the notion that the destruction of art
itself has intrinsic artistic value, it makes no sense—even under the most
postmodernist conceptions of art—to remove legal protections from existing
artwork. After all, even if some contemporary conceptions of art deny
that the term art has any meaning vis-à-vis many of the objects—paintings,
sculptures, drawings, et cetera—that in previous eras may have qualified
as artwork, these objects may nevertheless continue to have value in the
postmodern era as historical, sociological, or political artifacts—“historical

104.
105.
art).
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fossils,” in Danto’s view.106 So given that these artifacts still have value
of some sort even after the end of art, the only way to justify destroying
those objects is to demonstrate that the destruction produces other
social benefits, such as the production of new, more worthwhile artwork,
probably in the form of conceptual pieces representing the advance of
philosophy.
Unfortunately, the examples Professor Adler uses to bolster the artistic
argument in favor of the destruction and desecration of art provide
unconvincing support for this thesis. Professor Adler’s primary example
is a notorious case from 2001 in which two British conceptual artists
known as the Chapman brothers purchased a rare set of Francisco de
Goya’s Disaster of War prints and proceeded to deface the images in those
prints, thereby destroying the originals by superimposing pictures of puppy
dogs and clown heads.107 The defaced images were titled, appropriately
enough, Insult to Injury, and the show at the Modern Art Oxford gallery
in which the images were shown for the first time was called, even more
appropriately, The Rape of Creativity.108 Professor Adler seems to argue
that the Chapman brothers’ defacement of the Goya prints is every bit as
artistically significant as the original pieces:
Goya, as the Chapmans remind us, was a symbol of the “individuated Romantic
artist.” Goya held out hope that art could address our deepest humanity. By
attacking the ultimate expression of art’s moral voice, Insult to Injury becomes
a meditation on the loss of that conception of art. The Chapmans’ work
proclaims that the romantic idea of art as an exalted realm, expressive of our
humanity and imbued with the creative spirit of the author, is over.109

Perhaps art’s moral voice is lost—it certainly is lost on the Chapmans
—but there are at least three other ways of viewing the Chapmans’ attack
on work that, as Professor Adler herself recognizes, is revered and idolized
in the art world. One alternative way of viewing the Chapmans’ work is
through the lens of what they offer as a substitute for the ideal of art that
they are attacking. They are attacking, to quote Professor Adler, the “idea
of art as an exalted realm, expressive of our humanity and imbued with
the creative spirit of the author.”110 Unfortunately, Professor Adler does
106. See Danto, supra note 83, at 7.
107. Adler, supra note 2, at 281–82.
108. Jonathan Jones, Look What We Did, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 31, 2003, at
G2, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/culture/2003/mar/31/artsfeatures.turner prize2003.
109. Adler, supra note 2, at 282 (footnotes omitted) (quoting JAKE CHAPMAN &
DINOS CHAPMAN, Introduction to INSULT TO INJURY (2004)).
110. Id.

63

not discuss what they offer in exchange, which is basically an idea of art
as a superficial and commercial enterprise, devoid of humanity, and
imbued with the creative spirit of the dollar, the pound, and the euro.
They come by this approach naturally. The Chapmans are members of
the Young British Artists, also known as the YBAs, a designation coined in
the early 1990s by the British advertising magnate, Thatcherite minion,
gallery owner, and new-art entrepreneur Charles Saatchi.111 Other artists
in Saatchi’s stable include Damien Hirst, whose most famous work is
probably still his shark in formaldehyde,112 and Tracey Emin, who is
best known for a piece called My Bed, which was comprised of exactly
that—the artist’s unmade bed “littered with blood-stained underwear,
condoms and lubricant.”113 My point is not to highlight the contrast
between the sublime Goya and the crass vandals who would destroy his
work; my point is simply to point out that there are two very different
conceptions of art competing here, and it is not at all clear that the
Chapmans’ conception of art is correct, much less that it should be
allowed to achieve an aesthetic victory by exterminating its adversary.
A second way of viewing the Chapman brothers’ work is through the
lens of technical competence. The Chapmans’ use of materials and
technique is, to put it mildly, unconventional. In addition to the defaced
Goya prints, they have produced works using materials such as mannequins,
plastic models, cheap plastic toys, snakes and bugs, and sex dolls.114
There are many ways to explain the Chapman brothers’ avoidance of
traditional materials and techniques. One possible explanation is that the
Chapman brothers simply do not paint or draw very well.115 Another
111. For a general discussion of Saatchi and his relationship with the YBAs and
Margaret Thatcher, see Deborah Solomon, The Collector, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 26,
1999, at 44. See also infra notes 170–75 and accompanying text.
112. The shark was eventually sold to an American collector, providing Saatchi
with a profit of nearly seven million pounds. Richard Brooks, Hirst’s Shark Is Sold to
America, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Jan. 16, 2005, at 1.
113. Eric Konigsberg, Quite Big in Britain, Not Quite in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2009, at C1.
114. Works using these materials can be found on the Chapman brothers’ portion of
the White Cube Gallery website. See Jake and Dinos Chapman, WHITE CUBE, http://white
cube.com/artists/jake_dinos_chapman/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
115. Credibility was recently added to the suspicion that conceptual artists may lack
certain basic artistic skills by the overwhelmingly negative critical response to a show of
new paintings by Damien Hirst, one of the Chapman brothers’ fellow high-profile
conceptual artists and Charles Saatchi stablemates. After spending his career marketing
conceptual art and a few schematic paintings—most of which were actually produced by
other people—Hirst responded to the increasing prevalence of traditional painting, see
infra notes 165–87 and accompanying text, by trying to paint. The result was
devastating. Some of the reviewers’ comments about his work include: “[The paintings
are] thoroughly derivative. Their handling is weak. They’re extremely boring . . . .
Hirst, as a painter, is at about the level of a not-very-promising, first-year art student.”
Tom Lubbock, “Are Hirst’s Paintings Any Good? No, They’re Not Worth Looking at,”
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possible explanation is that they prefer three-dimensional work to twodimensional work. Yet another possible explanation is that they are
participating in a competition between different styles of art by defacing
prominent examples of the competing style. Whichever explanation is
the true one, each leads to the conclusion that the destruction of works
such as the Goya prints is not a terribly creative enterprise. At worst,
such destruction simply reflects the artist’s own lack of skill; at best, it is
an effort to destroy a competing vision of art. Again, under this view of
the Chapman brothers’ work, the moral rights model’s insistence on
protecting existing art seems to be the preferable approach.
A third way of viewing the Chapman brothers’ work is through the
prism of artistic motivation. Professor Adler gives the Chapman brothers a
lot of credit. She argues that the Chapman brothers’ defacement of the
Goya prints had the intent and effect of attacking the image of the idealized
Romantic individual artist in order to pronounce dead the conception of
art based on that Romantic ideal.116 The problem is that this does not
really seem to be the case with the Chapman brothers. Even their supporters
concede that they are somewhat juvenile characters.117 Perhaps their

INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 14, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/
art/features/are-hirsts-paintings-any-good-no-theyre-not-worth-looking-at-1802080.html.
“At its worst, Hirst’s drawing just looks amateurish and adolescent. His brushwork lacks
that oomph and panache that makes you believe in the painter’s lies. He can’t yet carry
it off. . . . [T]hese paintings are a memento mori for a reputation.” Adrian Searle,
Damien Hirst’s Paintings Are Deadly Dull, G UARDIAN (London), Oct. 14, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2009/oct/14/damien-hirst-paintings-wallacecollection. “Although they have impact as a group, individually many of the paintings
simply don’t pass muster. Details are tentatively painted; compositions fall apart under
scrutiny. . . . [A]nyone who first encountered Hirst through these works would be
entirely justified in wondering what all the fuss had been about.” Sarah Crompton,
Damien Hirst: The Blue Paintings at the Wallace Collection, Review, TELEGRAPH
(London), Oct. 13, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/art-reviews/6317313/
Damien-Hirst-The-Blue-Paintings-at-the-Wallace-Collection-review.html.
The paintings are dreadful. . . .
....
These works are utterly derivative of Bacon (give or take a dash of
Giacometti), but they completely lack his painterly skill. And their metaphors
are as ham-fisted as the application of pigment.
. . . [T]he artist who has made his reputation with shock now produces works
that are shockingly bad.
Rachel Campbell-Johnston, Damien Hirst Abandons Shock of the New for OldFashioned Art—But It’s Shockingly Bad, TIMES (London), Oct. 14, 2009, at 4.
116. Adler, supra note 2, at 282.
117. As the Daily Telegraph’s art critic once noted—in a generally favorable
review of the Chapman brothers’ show at the Modern Art Oxford—“I long ago reached
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defacement of the Goya prints was a serious effort to make a serious point,
or maybe it was the functional equivalent of a spoiled kid’s standing on
a coffee table and shouting “look at me” at the top of his voice. The fact
is, it is more than a little strange for artists who are trying to denounce
the concept of the heroic individual artist to draw so much attention to
themselves by casting themselves in the roles of the heroic destroyers of
the outdated Romantic ideal of the individual artist. The more plausible
explanation is that the Chapman brothers are ambitious strivers who
happened to hit on a perfect ploy to cultivate the publicity that is central
to their artistic and commercial personas. They are not really destroying
Goya; rather, they are feeding off him. If the Chapmans had published
multiple pages of pictures depicting clowns and puppies on regular drawing
paper, the world’s response would likely have been embarrassed silence.
But publish the same pictures of clowns and puppies pasted onto copies
of rare Goya prints, and suddenly the Chapmans have generated for
themselves a cause célèbre. After all, if the person who produced the
Goyas is famous and world renowned, then the persons who destroyed
the Goyas should be even more so.
The question here is not whether the Chapmans are good or bad
artists, or whether their attack on the Goya prints served some higher
artistic ideal or was simply a crass commercial ploy. The question is
whether any of these possible interpretations of the Chapmans’ work—
which, like Professor Adler, I am using as a surrogate for the full range
of conceptual and other nontraditional art—justifies the destruction of
existing art. Almost everything that the Chapmans wanted to do by way
of critiquing Romantic notions of art and artists—assuming that is what
they wanted to do—could be achieved without destroying the original
Goya prints. Pasting their puppy dogs and clown heads onto reproductions
of the Goya prints would have served much the same purpose as defacing
the originals. The only objective that would not be achieved by using
reproductions is the one that has little or no connection to the making of
art: that is, the craving for publicity that would be quenched by the public’s
vociferous response to the fact that the les enfants terribles have just
destroyed an irreplaceable original work of art. Perhaps there is some
argument for why generating publicity for the likes of the Chapman
brothers is worth the loss of the Goyas, but I do not believe that Professor
Adler has yet articulated one.

the conclusion that the Chapmans are genuinely strange people, two grown men arrested
in early adolescence.” Richard Dorment, Inspired Vandalism, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Apr. 30, 2003, at 17, available at 2003 WLNR 4187006.
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C. Reconceptualizing Moral Rights Statutes
The Chapman brothers and similar conceptual artists highlight one of
the unspoken consequences of the theories of art advanced by Professors
Danto and Adler. The efforts of Professors Danto and Adler to reconcile
art with contemporary art theory envision more than just the end of art;
they also envision the end of the artist. Oddly enough, this leads them to
glorify the likes of the Chapman brothers—who long ago abandoned any
pretense of producing anything but the most conceptual of conceptual art,
but who are not exactly shy about attracting attention to themselves in
all the ways that are presumably characteristic of the typical Romantic
artist. This seeming inconsistency aside, the notion that the individual
artist is a useless anachronism who died along with art itself has special
relevance for discussions of moral rights statutes. In Professor Adler’s
criticism of moral rights statutes such as VARA, she focuses on the most
obvious, pragmatic objective of such statutes, which is to protect art on
behalf of the entire culture. 118 As she says, the theory of the statutes’
proponents is that the artist will protect art from those who seek to
destroy or deface it, thereby allowing the culture as a whole to benefit in
perpetuity from the existence of that art.119 Professor Adler, on the other
hand, registers serious doubts as to whether this is true.
Focusing on this pragmatic objective allows Professor Adler to make
her strongest criticism of the moral rights regime. She notes, for example,
that it is by no means a foregone conclusion that artists will be the best
protectors of their work.120 Artists are not always the best prospects to
judge the quality of their own work, and they will have a tendency to
overprotect bad work and underprotect good work.121 And in any event,
as Professor Adler points out, nothing in the moral rights regime prohibits
artists from destroying everything they have ever produced, thus
undermining altogether the notion that artists are protecting art on behalf of

118. See Adler, supra note 2, at 272 (“VARA and most U.S. state moral rights laws
are premised on the view that moral rights serve not only the interests of individual
artists, but also a shared public interest in art.”).
119. See id. (“[The statutes operate] based on the assumption that there is an
unproblematic convergence between the public interest and the interest of the artist who
created the work. His decisions, according to the assumption, will inevitably be in the
public interest.”).
120. See id. at 271–72.
121. See id. at 274 (discussing how “artists will sometimes want to preserve works
that many if not most members of the public wish to destroy or modify”).
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the culture as a whole.122 Therefore, the argument goes, not only is the
individual Romantic artist a theoretical anachronism; individual artists do
not serve the purposes assigned to them by moral rights statutes anyway.
Professor Adler is certainly right to point out that moral rights statutes
depend on the individual artist to serve the cultural function of preserving
art for future generations. And indeed, part of the statutory reliance on
individual artists is predicated on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
theories glorifying the individual. As Raymond Sarraute has noted, the
entire concept of moral rights is based on the Hegelian notion that an
“intimate bond . . . exists between a literary or artistic work and its
author’s personality.”123 But although it is true that moral rights statutes
use the individual artist as the agent responsible for the protection of art,
it is not necessary to defend the statutes only on the grounds that they
are protecting some mystical connection between artist and art. There
are other ways of conceptualizing why these statutes rely on the artist to
protect his or her work, some of which show the statutes in a light that
makes them seem quite different from the exercise in artistic narcissism
that Professor Adler describes. There are at least three alternative ways
of conceptualizing why moral rights statutes allocate to individual artists
the responsibility to protect art.
1. Moral rights law as protection of the artist’s personality, which is
externalized in works of art. This is the most traditional way of
conceptualizing moral rights statutes and the one on which Professor
Adler focuses her criticism. Under this theory of moral rights, protecting art
is almost secondary to protecting the reputation, dignity, and psychic peace
of the artist.
When contemplating the theoretical framework of moral rights, it cannot be
denied that the heart of a moral rights violation involves more than reputational
damage. The essence of a moral rights injury lies in its assault upon the author’s
personality, as that personality is embodied in the fruits of her creation.124

This theory about moral rights legislation is advanced much more
explicitly in European moral rights laws, especially the laws of France,
and there are critics of American law, including Professor Kwall, who
claim that this law is insufficiently sensitive to what Kwall calls “the
author’s personality-based narrative of creation.”125 Nevertheless, the
generally individualistic tone of those supporting moral rights legislation
in the United States—including Congress’s explanation of its support for
122. See id. at 273–74.
123. Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists
Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 465 (1968).
124. Kwall, supra note 1, at 24.
125. Id. at 25.
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VARA126—is sufficiently strong evidence that Congress intended to rely
on this rationale to justify Professor Adler’s criticism. And much of this
criticism may be warranted. Admittedly, this explanation for moral rights
statutes is somewhat problematic in that it conceptualizes moral rights as
a purely individualistic affair and takes into account only indirectly the
broader public interest in art. Under this conception of moral rights, the
interest of society as a whole is something of an afterthought. Society
may benefit from the access to the art that is made available by the artist’s
protection of his or her own work, but that benefit is entirely beside the
real point of the statute, which is to benefit the artist herself. But as
noted, this is not the only possible justification for moral rights statutes.
2. Moral rights as the formal embracing of the romantic artist paradigm.
A second possible rationale for moral rights statutes also embraces the
individual artist but does so in a different way and for different reasons
than the protections offered under rationale one. This second rationale
would abandon any pretense that moral rights statutes are about the
individual works of art at all. Instead, this rationale would offer the
possibility that moral rights statutes are only about the (presumably
selfish) interests of individual artists who continued to be productive and
not at all about society’s interest in the works that those artists have
already produced. Under this conception, as in rationale one, art is
protected because it is perceived to be the externalization of the artist’s
personality, but protecting art under moral rights statutes is secondary to
protecting the atmosphere of artistic productivity generated by the protective
cloak of moral rights. The key difference between rationale one and
rationale two is that rationale one is focused on the past—artwork that has
already been produced—and rationale two is focused on the future:
work that has not yet seen the light of day.
Under this rationale for the protection of moral rights, we can once
again suggest that society benefits just as much as the individual artist.
The only difference is that instead of benefiting from access to the
individual pieces of art that will be protected by moral rights, society
will benefit from the cultivation and protection of an artistic community
that includes a certain basic level of expressive protection for those working
within it. The theory is that artists who know that their work will be
protected against those who seek to desecrate or destroy it will be more

126. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6915 (describing the statute’s purpose).
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rather than less likely to produce art. Society’s promise to protect an artist’s
future work is secured by society’s demonstrated protection of the artist’s
past work. Admittedly, this is a leap of faith—faith that by protecting the
artist today, the artist will see fit to produce notable works of art tomorrow.
It is difficult to say which rationale for the protection of moral rights
Professor Adler would like less: rationale one or rationale two. Presumably,
she would not like either rationale very much. Both rationales continue
to rely for the protection of art on the will and self-interest of the individual
artist. Both rationales assume that the categories of both our “artist” and
“art” still exist and still have legal significance. Both rationales assume
that the category of art still has meaning and will exclude some things
that probably fall into the much more expansive definition of art proposed
by Professor Adler in her article. And finally, both rationales assume—
contra Professor Adler—that the destruction of art is a bad thing and
should be stopped through the application of legal sanctions. These aspects
of both rationales for moral rights statutes suggest the need for a third
rationale that may satisfy some of Professor Adler’s—and other postmodern
or postaesthetic critics’—concerns.
3. The skepticism rationale. The third possible justification for moral
rights statutes focuses on neither the individual artists’ interests nor the
social benefits that will come from protecting individual artists’ rights.
Indeed, this justification would not focus on any of the beneficiaries of
the protection of art. This third justification focuses instead on the nature of
the individuals and entities who would destroy or desecrate art in the
absence of moral rights statutes. This third justification would base moral
rights statutes on the same abiding skepticism of the impulse to censor
or suppress expression that motivates much of First Amendment
jurisprudence. 127

127. This deep skepticism originates in Oliver Wendell Holmes’s opinions in cases
such as Gitlow v. New York and Abrams v. United States, in which Holmes makes
intellectual skepticism the cornerstone of the right of free speech. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If in the long run the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces
of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their
chance and have their way.”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas . . . .”). This skeptical impulse lives on in the Court’s modern First Amendment
jurisprudence in the form of rules strictly limiting the government’s ability to regulate
speech based on the viewpoint or content of the speech. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment generally prevents government from
proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas
expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.” (citations omitted)).
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The three entities most likely to seek to destroy or desecrate existing
artwork are the government, artistic institutions such as galleries and
museums, and other artists. The argument here is that those who would
most likely seek to silence artistic speech—either by destroying a specific
piece of art or mangling it beyond all recognition—are not to be trusted.
They are not to be trusted because they are all self-interested in various
ways. The state is not to be trusted because it is as likely as not following a
political or religious agenda that cares nothing whatsoever for aesthetics
or art but rather for the perceived slights of the mainstream culture that
art is seen to communicate.128 Galleries, museums, and other artists have a
more personal agenda. The likelihood is not—as Professor Adler would
have it—that they are trying to provide something positive out of the
destruction of an existing piece of art but rather that they are trying to
achieve aesthetic victory for one type of art by destroying the competition.
Artistic agendas can be just as fierce as political agendas, if somewhat
more esoteric.129 The point is that none of these actors is likely to be
advancing the interests of the culture as a whole by destroying or
desecrating pieces of art that he or she does not like.
Take as an example the Chapman brothers’ desecration of the Goya
prints discussed above.130 A consideration of why the Chapmans
desecrated the Goya prints leads to the conclusion that the Chapmans
either used the destruction of the Goya prints purely as a publicity stunt
or viewed themselves as being in some kind of aesthetic competition
between the kind of art produced by the Chapmans and the kind of art
produced by Goya. If the first interpretation of their actions is accurate,
then there is no plausible rationale for why society should allow a couple
of shallow grandstanders to destroy artistic works that most of society
reveres. If the Chapmans intended to engage in a legitimate exercise of
artistic and aesthetic criticism, on the other hand, then the nature of the
attack on art in the style of Goya must be respected, but there is still no
reason to respect the means by which they administered their attack. In
other words, it is possible to mount a perfectly effective critique of original
art without destroying original art.

128. See supra note 49.
129. For example, the nasty fight instigated by Ivan Massow’s disparaging comments
about the state of conceptual art, which led to his departure as chairman of London’s
Institute for Contemporary Arts. See infra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 108–13 and accompanying text.
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Admittedly, the attitude of skepticism toward those who destroy or
desecrate art carries with it an implicit affirmative assertion of aesthetic
value. Viewed through the prism of this third alternative justification,
moral rights statutes can therefore be seen as social statements of artistic
principle or ideology. These statutes are anticommercial, hostile to
marketplace notions of artistic value, opposed to faddish conceptions of
art, and antithetical to collectivist and institutional conceptions of what
should be valued in the art world. These statutes also probably presume
that anything falling into the category of “art” will be defined by its
visual—as opposed to its conceptual—characteristics. Conceptual art can
fall into the category of art, but only if the concept is accompanied by or
embodied in some visual manifestation of a sort that can plausibly be
deemed to have some aesthetic substance. Finally, almost by definition
these statutes are predicated on the notion that art has a history, that both
old and new art are worthwhile, and that the end of art has not yet arrived
and probably never will—otherwise, why protect art for the future?
By contrast, the view of art advanced by Professor Adler and those
such as Professor Danto who offer similar theories will tend to have the
opposite implications. This conception of art is inherently more commercial
and market based than the conception of art implicit in moral rights
statutes, in the sense that the evaluation of the sorts of contemporary art
to which Professor Adler appeals will tend to be subject to something
that could be called the Saatchi effect. In other words, in the contemporary
art world envisioned by Professor Adler, the gallery owners, their coterie
of collectors, and institutions such as the Tate Modern in London and to
a lesser extent American museums with a focus on contemporary art
such as the Whitney in New York will have even more power than that
possessed by predecessor institutions in previous artistic eras to anoint
new artistic superstars. One reason is because of the type of work being
produced today. There may be a point to the Chapman brothers’ clownface-enhanced Goyas, but most people will have to be told by intermediaries
such as museums or galleries what that meaning is and why the piece
constitutes art.
Another reason for the increased power of artistic institutions in the
world envisioned by Professor Adler involves simple logistics. Much
conceptual art takes a form that cannot be marketed as a painting would
be. The work is often large or otherwise unwieldy. For example, among
the items that the domesticated131 British graffiti artist Banksy has included
131. Although much of Banksy’s cachet turns on his background as an illicit street
artist, his paintings now command prices of more than £100,000 each. William Langley,
For the Gauguin of Graffiti It Was All About Tagging. Now He’s into Six-Figure Price
Tags, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 19, 2007, at 27, available at 2007 WLNR
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in recent shows are a live thirty-seven-year-old full-grown Indian elephant
named Rai “painted crimson and embossed with gold fleurs-de-lys”132 in
a show in Los Angeles and a burnt-out ice cream truck133 in a show in
Bristol, England. Very few people will want a glass box with a shark stored
in formaldehyde sitting in their living room, much less a live, fully grown
Indian elephant. The logical market for such pieces therefore will be not
a traditional market of individuals who purchase art in order to look at
that art but rather individuals who purchase art as an investment, or
galleries—who will stockpile the art in the hopes of making a profit in the
future—and museums—who will often develop financial relationships
with the galleries and collectors, thereby providing the imprimatur
of legitimacy and status to the art in question.134
The growing importance of galleries and institutions dovetails with the
emphasis placed on new and unique concepts. Conceptual art depends
largely on the shocking juxtaposition of or sudden insight into some
aspect of the world. Novelty is key. If a piece of conceptual art is not
novel or simply presents variations on another concept already familiar
in the art world, then that piece of art is not likely to succeed, even by its
own terms. In this context, fads are inevitable, and the new and unique
will always be favored over the old and the been-done. Subtlety is not
valued in conceptual art, nor is the incremental building on what has
come before. Existing art is therefore endangered under such a system
because contemporary art relies so heavily on the immediate impulse of
those who would destroy what has come before for purposes of present
glory. Finally, the view of art that contrasts with the view informing
moral rights statutes inevitably treats art as transitory, ahistorical, and
essentially unworthy of serious consideration beyond the momentary

5169346. According to the editor of London’s graffiti magazine Bomb Alert, “He has
absolutely no respect in London’s graffiti community . . . . His message is naïve.” Id.
132. Id.
133. Miranda Sawyer, Take a Stuffy Old Institution. Remix. Add Wit. It’s Banksy v
the Museum, GUARDIAN (London), June 13, 2009, at 11, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2009/jun/13/banksy-bristol-city-museum.
134. Illustrative of this is the Brooklyn Museum’s questionable financial dealings in
connection with the Sensation show, which was comprised entirely of work owned by
Charles Saatchi. See David Barstow, Brooklyn Museum Recruited Donors Who Stood To
Gain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1999, at 1. Saatchi and other self-interested gallery owners,
auction houses, and collectors contributed to the Museum substantial funds to finance the
show. As The New York Times summed up the situation, “[T]he ‘Sensation’ exhibition
at the Brooklyn Museum of Art has been financed by companies and individuals with a
direct commercial interest in the works of the British artists in the show.” Id.
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impulse that produced it. Under this conception, art becomes merely a
toy of the contemporary culture, which is why it is so easy for those who
would oppose moral rights statutes on postmodernist grounds to give up
something such as Goya’s Disasters of War series.
At the end of the day, then, we have two completely different views of
art that are apparently irreconcilable. One view asserts that art continues
to grow as a discipline; the other view asserts that art is essentially dead.
One asserts that the visual components of art are still valuable and
significant; the other asserts that art focusing on the visual is essentially
an anachronism and that this form of art has been superseded by art
reconceived as concrete manifestations of philosophical concepts. One
asserts that the individual artist is still the primary agent of all art, and
the other asserts that collective institutions—galleries, museums, or groups
of art workers—have taken over from the individual artist as the primary
engine of creativity and that the individual artist should be relegated to the
dustbin of history. Most importantly, one asserts that existing art is
important in itself and should be protected and preserved, and the other
asserts that we should allow examples of existing art to be used as fodder
for new conceptual exercises. The question is whether we have to choose
one set of presumptions over another to resolve the question of whether
moral rights statutes deserve to survive.
In the next Part, I will argue that we do not. Specifically, I will argue
that there are a series of pragmatic reasons for rejecting the attacks on
moral rights statutes that do not involve challenging the basic theoretical
assumptions that motivate those attacks. In the end, advocates for these
different conceptions of art will continue to battle in the art magazines,
museums, and studios of artists. The point here is simply that no conception
of art should be allowed to win the theoretical battle over the meaning of
art by changing the legal landscape in a way that allows that point of
view to dominate. Also, no conception of art should be allowed to change
the legal landscape in a way that removes from artists who take an
alternative point of view the right to protect their work.
IV. WHY ART (AND ARTISTS) STILL MATTER: SEVERAL REASONS WHY
ARTISTS SHOULD (STILL) BE ALLOWED TO PROTECT THE
INTEGRITY OF THEIR ART
At the outset of the discussion in this Part, it should be acknowledged
that, as a practical matter, VARA and its state-law equivalents have not
had the broad effect that moral rights proponents may have hoped. Most
courts have taken the approach of the district judge in one prominent
VARA case, in which the judge concluded:
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[A]s a broad matter, courts should be wary of attempts to invoke VARA where
a violation of the explicitly recognized rights of attribution or integrity is
difficult to discern. Expansive application of VARA’s embodiment of “moral
rights” was not contemplated by Congress and generally has not been
countenanced by the courts.135

Nonetheless, even if moral rights statutes are not applied by the courts to
protect art in every single instance in which an artist alleges a violation
of the statutes’ attribution or integrity protections, the statutes still serve
important purposes. In the first place, the statutes do protect some art
some of the time. In the absence of the statutes, some art would be distorted
or desecrated—especially in an art world defined to a certain extent by
the likes of the Chapman brothers. But secondly, and possibly even more
importantly, the statutes serve the expressive purpose of advancing society’s
view that art is important and that damaging or destructing art violates
this key social value. In a country that is increasingly defined by
commercial values, the statutes announce that art is so important that we
have placed it even above commerce, in the sense that even a purchaser
of a painting is not allowed to violate an artist’s moral rights.
What follows is a series of arguments rebutting some of the claims
made by Professor Adler against the regime of moral rights. With one or
two exceptions, these arguments do not challenge her larger theoretical
concept of art and its general meaning. For the most part, the claim here
is that even if we accept Professor Adler’s general critique of contemporary
art, it still makes more sense to have moral rights statutes than not to
have them.
A. The Death of the Individual Artist Is Not Dispositive
As noted above, one of Professor Adler’s primary claims is that the
concept of the Romantic, lone artist is now dead.136 As a rhetorical
device meant to emphasize the changing relationship of the artist to the
larger culture, or as an assertion of the effect that history has on the
individual artist, or as a description of the debt any artists owe to their
predecessors and compatriots, this assertion is perfectly plausible. As a
practical description of how art actually comes into being, however, the
statement makes no sense. While it is true that some art comes into

135. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 565 F. Supp. 2d
245, 258 (D. Mass. 2008), vacated in part on other grounds, 593 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2010).
136. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
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being as the result of collaboration between various individuals, most art
is the product of one individual’s execution of that same individual’s
artistic vision. Even if that individual artist is affected by history, and by
artists who went before, and by compatriots working in the new studio
next door, all of these influences still have to be absorbed, synthesized,
and put to use in a way that generates new art. One does not have to
accept Kirk Douglas’s version of the artist137 as in any way accurate
to nevertheless recognize that the person who actually puts paint to
canvas is in an entirely different position than another person standing in
the same room and critiquing the painting.
This intuitive recognition that the person who actually does the work
is going to be invested in that work at a different level of intensity than
anyone else is the reason that moral rights statutes give to artists and
artists alone the right to decide whether or not their work will be defaced.
As Professor Adler periodically suggests, this is an overinclusive way of
going about the protection of art since artists will be naturally inclined to
protect most or all of their own work. But the overinclusiveness is
intentional. It is part of the general perspective embodied in these statutes,
which is that more art is better than less art.
In the end, we should be debating the validity of this perspective,
rather than the ethereal and frankly academic question of whether we should
continue to view artists through the misty lens of nineteenth-century
Romanticism. When the debate is focused in the proper way, it is difficult
to see how Professor Adler’s position on moral rights statutes could
prevail. After all, even if her description of the trends in contemporary
art is correct, and even if much of the art that moral rights statutes will
protect will be distinctly counter to that trend, there is still no good
argument against letting that art survive. Even if we end up preserving a
great deal of bad art, or anachronistic art, or art that runs against the
grain of history, so what? No one is any worse off, except perhaps for
those who want to take the art being preserved and destroy it for their
own purposes. Whether we should recognize this as a legitimate claim
against the preservation of moral rights statutes will be addressed below.
But for present purposes, it is important simply to note that the death of
the romantic artist does not automatically spell the death of moral rights
statutes.

137. See LUST FOR LIFE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1956) (depicting the life of Vincent
van Gogh, played by Kirk Douglas).
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B. Destruction Is Destruction, Not Creation
One of the problems with Professor Adler’s account of art theory and
moral rights statutes is that she often moves back and forth between the
abstract and the concrete in ways that muddle her critique. It is
relatively easy to agree with most of her abstract propositions, until she
takes those abstract propositions and tries to draw concrete conclusions
about what should be done with regard to the protection of art under
moral rights statutes. It is one thing for Professor Adler to argue as a
theoretical matter, for example, that “‘art’ as a category has come to
be about its own metaphorical destruction.”138 It is quite another thing,
however, to argue immediately thereafter that “the physical destruction
of works of art becomes a powerful expression of the metaphorical
essence of art.”139 It is also quite another thing to assert that in the new
world of art, it is impossible to produce new artistic creations without
simultaneously destroying existing examples of art.140
As noted above, one problem with equating destruction and creation is
that it takes an abstract assertion about the nature of contemporary art
and transfers that observation unchanged into the real world, where the
concrete consequences of the principle’s application are both harmful
and unnecessary. In the real world, destruction and creation are two
completely different activities. As the title of this subsection indicates,
destruction is not creation; it is simply destruction. The harmful aspect
of this proposition is that welcoming the destruction of art will have only
one certain effect: some art that currently exists—including art that, like
Goya’s Disasters of War series, is both irreplaceable and, to quote one of
the critics cited by Professor Adler, “a treasure”141—will be destroyed,
never to be seen again.
From the perspective of Professor Adler, it should not matter that the
Chapmans destroyed artwork of which there are few duplicates remaining
in the world. If she is true to her theory that destruction is “a central
quality of ‘art’ itself”142 and therefore that existing art is simply awaiting its
own destruction, then the primary value of existing art is that it awaits
138. Adler, supra note 2, at 284.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 279 (“[T]here is an artistic value in modifying, defacing and even
destroying unique works of art. In fact, these actions may reflect the essence of
contemporary-art making.”).
141. Id. at 282 (quoting Jones, supra note 108).
142. Id. at 284.
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being used as fodder for future art. Under this transitory notion of art, it
should not matter whether the existing art/fodder is unique or important,
nor should it matter whether the images contained within existing art
could ever be replaced or replicated. Thus, it is odd that Professor Adler
chides the Taliban for destroying the famous sculptures of the Bamiyan
Buddhas in the Kazarajat region in central Afghanistan.143 Admittedly,
the Taliban was not doing so for artistic reasons. But would the magnitude
of the cultural travesty that is represented by the destruction of the
sculptures be any different if, instead of the Taliban, the Chapman brothers
had somehow managed to purchase those sculptures, destroyed them, and
then erected statues of clowns in their place? This may not be that farfetched of a proposition, considering that Jake Chapman “has described
the international opposition to the Taliban[’s] blowing up ancient Buddhist
sculptures ‘strange,’ describing it with bland semi-admiration as the ‘live,
vital religious opposition to something that has a direct and local meaning to
them.’”144 The simple reality is that the destruction of art is the destruction
of art; the intentions of the destroyer really do not matter. Therefore,
those who argue that moral rights statutes should be dispensed with because
they inhibit the destruction of art have an obligation to explain why the
destruction of art is, in and of itself, a good thing.
C. The Production of New Art Does Not Require the
Destruction of Old Art
In the previous paragraph, I asserted that if existing art is destroyed in
the name of producing new, contemporary art, then the only guaranteed
consequence of this act will be the elimination of art and the robbing of
future generations who might want to see that art. Although this is
indisputably true, it must be acknowledged that we will receive something
in exchange for the defaced existing artwork. What we will get in exchange
is new work similar to the Chapmans’. Maybe there is a case to be made
that it is a fair trade to exchange Goya for the Chapman brothers, although it
is frankly difficult to see what the components of that case might be.
Fortunately, we do not have to make this difficult choice because even
for artists like the Chapman brothers the destruction of preexisting works of
art is not necessary to produce the artistic message they are attempting to
communicate. The images that the Chapmans are putting forth, that is,
143. See id. at 290.
144. Johann Hari, The Art of Subverting the Enlightenment, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 5,
2007),
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-hari/johann-harithe-art-of-subverting-the-enlightenment-435131.html (quoting Jake Chapman on Georges
Bataille: An Interview with Simon Baker, PAPERS OF SURREALISM (Winter 2003), http://www.
surrealismcentre.ac.uk/papersofsurrealism/journal1/acrobat_files/chapman_12.pdf).
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images from Goya’s Disasters of War doctored with pictures of
clowns and such, could be produced just as effectively without destroying a
single original Goya print. That is, instead of destroying original Goyas,
they could use as the basis for their work reproductions of the Goya prints,
which if produced professionally could be virtually indistinguishable from
the originals. The resulting new artwork would be for all practical purposes
exactly the same as the work the Chapman brothers have already given
us—in the sense that the image presented to the viewer would be that of
Goya prints defaced with clown faces. Of course, if the Chapmans took
this tack, they would lose both the shock and the PR value of having
destroyed actual copies of an irreplaceable piece of Spanish art. But so
what? The shock and PR value in question have nothing to do with the
aesthetic worth of the piece; they have to do only with the notoriety—
and therefore, probably the commercial value—of the piece, which should
not enter into our consideration when determining which art gets destroyed
and which art gets created.
D. The Tendentiousness of Artists
Professor Adler repeatedly expresses her reluctance to give artists the
right to decide whether their own work is preserved. Although she
briefly expresses reluctance on the ground that artists will be
underprotective—that artists will refuse to protect work that should be
protected 145—by far her greater concern is that artists will be
overprotective, in that they will protect a great deal of work that
Professor Adler believes should not be protected.146 But the very thing
that Professor Adler fears is also at the very heart of moral rights
statutes. The reason moral rights statutes give to artists the right to
protect their work is precisely because we assume that artists will be
overprotective of that work. One reason this is perceived as a good thing
from society’s perspective is because artistic value is often determined
only long after art is produced. If an artist has protected work at a point
when that work is unrecognized, then society will benefit from the fact
that the work is still around when its value is belatedly acknowledged. It
145. See Adler, supra note 2, at 273 (discussing the phenomenon of artists’
destroying artwork in which the public has an interest).
146. See id. at 269 (“[The artist] cares so deeply about the fate of his art because it
is somehow his child and not just another object. Thus the artist feels personal anguish
when someone else modifies his artwork/child. . . . even though the child has grown up
and left home, and even though the father/artist has sold his child.” (footnote omitted)).
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is precisely when artists and their work are unrecognized that they are
most vulnerable to their work’s being defaced, destroyed, or altered in
ways that are contrary to the artist’s intentions.
One must concede the validity of Professor Adler’s criticism that this
system has a logical basis. It is logical to assume that artists will,
indeed, be likely to protect more work than an objective observer might
find worthwhile. On the other hand, so what? There seems to be no
downside to allowing artists to be overprotective and thereby preserve
work that will ultimately be deemed artistically inferior. The worst that
can happen is that some mediocre canvases or sculptures will remain
undefaced. If anything, the preservation/destruction calculus runs in the
opposite direction from that described by Professor Adler. The artists
who would get the most benefit from Professor Adler’s proposals are
those who destroy existing artwork to create their own; these artists
therefore logically have a vested interest in destroying artwork and in
advancing the notion of artistic destruction as an aesthetically salubrious
value. Just as artists operating under a moral rights regime have a
predisposition to overprotect art, artists operating under a regime that
abandons the concept of moral rights have an equally strong predisposition
to destroy art. Furthermore, the art that is most likely to be destroyed is
art that is well known, highly esteemed, and artistically notable. This is
because any art based on existing art is likely to use the existing art in
the same way the Chapman brothers do: to provide notoriety, publicity,
and automatic gravitas. So the greater the existing art—and therefore the
more valuable to society as a whole—the more likely it is to be used as
new-art fodder.
All of what is said above about new artists is especially true of new
artists who are not particularly good at what they do. Under Professor
Adler’s system, there is no quality control when it comes to vandalizing
or destroying old art for the sake of creating new art. And so we have
the Chapman brothers’ destroying Goya prints. Maybe the Chapmans
have as much talent as Goya, although I doubt anybody not financially
connected to the Chapmans would seriously attempt to make that claim.
But if we can agree that the Chapmans are not quite up to Goya’s talent
level, then society has suffered a net loss under Professor Adler’s regime. It
has given up great old art for new art that is substantially inferior or
worse. Of course, Goya is long dead, and therefore the particular work
produced by the Chapman brothers would not be protected under modern
moral rights statutes. But the same calculus works with new work produced
by living artists, which are protected by such statutes.
The only way of dealing with this uncomfortable truth from Professor
Adler’s perspective is to dispense altogether with evaluations of artistic
quality. Professor Adler’s scheme does not actually dispense with the
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entire category of “art,” as she seems to intend;147 it simply reduces
all art to the lowest common denominator. The untalented artist manqué
will no longer need to struggle to learn how to paint, draw, or sculpt; in
order to become a renowned artist, the poser will simply have to find
some talented artist’s painting or drawing and slap a clown face on it.
Destruction thus becomes mistaken for creativity.
The question, then, is: Do we want a system that encourages the
preservation of art, which will in no way inhibit the production of new
art, or do we want a system that encourages the destruction of art, with
no guarantees that the art we get in exchange will even come close to the
quality of the art we are sacrificing? Given the fact that most of the art
that is based on the destruction or desecration of existing art can be
produced using reproductions or other methods, this question comes down
to the fact that unless one is willing to argue that the destruction of art is
always a good thing, in and of itself, then the current system of moral
rights should be preserved.
E. Be Careful About Asserting that Art Doesn’t Exist, or that Art Is
Nothing More than Vandalism, Because Society
May Start To Believe You
Although the focus of Professor Adler’s article is on the proposition
that creative destruction is a defining feature of contemporary art, her
more radical claim is that the entire category of art has become
incoherent.148 The two propositions are obviously connected because if
art as a category has become incoherent, then all of the existing objects
previously classified as art are instantaneously converted into simple
cultural detritus, which may be destroyed at will. Professor Adler seems
invigorated by this possibility. She really does seem to believe that a
new and exciting creative spirit will be unleashed by renouncing the
concept of art and permitting the new post-artists to destroy or vandalize
what used to be art.
Professor Danto, on the other hand, drew very different conclusions
from his pronouncement of the end of art. On the one hand, he drew the

147. See id. at 295 (“[D]oes visual art as a category merit this special treatment?
I think the answer might be no. It once seemed obvious that there was a distinction
between art and other objects. But that is no longer the case. Indeed, I would argue that
the incoherence of the category of ‘art’ has become the subject of contemporary art.”).
148. See id. at 287.
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very liberating conclusion that art would now be much more ecumenical
and diversity would reign. On the other hand, the new diversity of art
would be a diversity of the worthless, the trivial, and the inconsequential.
As Marx might say, you can be an abstractionist in the morning, a photorealist
in the afternoon, a minimal minimalist in the evening. Or you can cut out paper
dolls or do what you damned please. The age of pluralism is upon us. It does
not matter any longer what you do, which is what pluralism means. When one
direction is as good as another direction, there is no concept of direction any
longer to apply. Decoration, self-expression, entertainment are, of course,
abiding human needs. There will always be a service for art to perform, if
artists are content with that.149

After this depressing eulogy for art itself, Danto then goes on to note that
“[t]he institutions of the art world—galleries, collectors, exhibitions,
journalism—which are predicated upon history and hence marking what
is new, will bit by bit wither away.”150 To be replaced, presumably, by the
home decorations department at Wal-Mart.
The problem with discussions such as this is that their intended audience
is within the artistic community itself. Discussions over the nature of art
have occurred at least since the ancient Greeks and probably before that.
When these esoteric discussions of the danger of art slop over the wall
and into the laps of policymakers, however, the discussions can do real
damage. The notion that art no longer exists would be music to the ears
of the Rudy Giulianis and latter-day Jesse Helmses of the world,
who would prefer to eradicate a great deal of art that communicates
messages with which they disagree. One reason modern bluenoses have
not been successful in censoring art that they do not like is that courts
treat art as high-value speech under the First Amendment,151 which can be
suppressed by the government only upon a showing of the highest
possible governmental interest. If the art community now takes the position
that art is little more than empty decoration, then First Amendment
protection will evaporate like the morning mist. Of course, this may be
perfectly alright with Professor Adler; after all, if one form of legal
protection of art—moral rights statutes—has outlived its purpose, then
149. Danto, supra note 83, at 34–35.
150. Id. at 35.
151. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602–03 (1998)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“It goes without saying that artistic expression lies within this
First Amendment protection. The constitutional protection of artistic works turns not on
the political significance that may be attributable to such productions, though they may
indeed comment on the political, but simply on their expressive character, which falls
within a spectrum of protected ‘speech’ extending outward from the core of overtly
political declarations. Put differently, art is entitled to full protection because our
‘cultural life,’ just like our native politics, ‘rest[s] upon [the] ideal’ of governmental
viewpoint neutrality.” (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)
(quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994))).
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perhaps the First Amendment protection of art has as well. Which is all
well and good, until the first conceptual artist attempts to put a
provocative piece of nonart in some public place and instigates the wrath
of some politician seeking to make a name for himself. At that point,
the category of art and all the legal protections that it brings with it
might seem pretty inviting.
F. If Everything Is Art, Then Nothing Is Art
The notion that the destruction of art can itself be a creative, artistic
act injects questions of intentionality into the question of whether acts of
artistic vandalism should be permitted or rather prosecuted as criminal
behavior. Professor Adler cites as a laudatory example of a recent
destruction artist the case of Pierre Pinoncelli, a Frenchman who in 2006
attacked Marcel Duchamp’s “readymade” sculpture The Fountain.152
Monsieur Pinoncelli fancies himself a performance artist, who “claimed
upon his arrest that his vandalism was itself a work of art.”153 Actually,
Pinoncelli attacked Duchamp’s sculpture not once but twice—once in
1993, when the sculpture was displayed at the Carré d’Art in Nîmes, and
once at a 2006 Dada exhibition at the Centre Pompidou in Paris.154 A quote
given to the press by Pinoncelli after the 1993 attack gives a slightly
different slant on his objectives than Professor Adler’s characterization
of an artist’s destroying old art to produce new art. At the time of the
1993 attack, Pinoncelli told the press that “he wanted to rescue the work
from its inflated status and restore it to its original use as a urinal.”155
This makes the gesture seem much more like a crass and even philistine
attack on art than like a noble effort to use one piece of art to create another.
If we view the world through the lens of Professor Adler’s proposals,
what are we to make of actions such as those of Mr. Pinoncelli? Does it
matter whether he intended to destroy Duchamp’s fountain in order to
produce a new work of art or rather simply for the sake of the action itself?
Assuming the vandal is attempting to be creatively destructive—as opposed
to destructively destructive—is it necessary that the vandal produce a
new work of art using the remains of the old? Does it matter that the

152. Adler, supra note 2, at 284.
153. Id.
154. Alan Riding, Conceptual Artist as Vandal: Walk Tall and Carry a Little Hammer
(or Ax), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2006, at B7.
155. Id.

83

new work of art is presented as nothing more than the act of vandalism
itself? And if the new work of art is nothing more than a simple act of
vandalism, then that work of art could be produced by anyone because acts
of vandalism do not usually require any special talents. Therefore,
presumably any act of vandalism committed by anyone should be
considered a legitimately expressive act by the theory of destruction-ascreation. So, for example, if Mr. Pinoncelli’s active vandalism is deemed to
be a creative act, what about Piero Cannata? In 1991, Cannata attacked
Michelangelo’s statue of David, damaging several toes on the sculpture’s
left foot.156 Although Cannata was an artist, he was—in the gentle phrasing
of The New York Times—“generally described as unbalanced.”157
The Duchamp sculpture vandalized by Pierre Pinoncelli was one of
Duchamp’s most famous. The Fountain is, of course, little more than a
urinal with the name R. Mutt painted on the side. This piece is now lauded
as a major turning point in modern art. Professor Adler’s descriptions of
the piece are common. It is described in portentous terms as “a ritual
desecration” of art and “an assault on the sacred boundary between art
and everyday objects.”158 What all of this high-toned praise for Duchamp’s
urinal sculpture misses is that the piece originated as a joke designed to
test the “no-jury” entry policy of an art exhibition that Duchamp helped
to organize. Duchamp and two friends purchased the urinal after a long
lunch one day in 1917 from an iron works in New York City.159 Duchamp
took the urinal back to his studio, painted the name R. Mutt and the date
1917 on the side very high, then submitted the piece to a large art exhibition,
titled the 1917 Independents, along with the fictitious R. Mutt’s
membership and application fee.160 The piece was rejected.
No one knows what happened to this original version of The Fountain,
and Duchamp himself told conflicting stories about the original
Fountain’s ultimate destination.161 The versions of The Fountain that
are in the museums today—including the one attacked by Pierre Pinoncelli
—were created in 1964 by a Milanese ceramicist who made a commercial
edition of eight Fountains, along with similar editions of other Duchamp
readymades.162 What could be Duchamp’s reason for authorizing multiple
reproductions of perhaps his most famous sculpture almost fifty years
after the original was lost? For all the grandiose claims about someone
who is “ritually desecrating art,” the simple answer is that he needed the
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
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Alan Cowell, Assailant Damages David, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at L3.
Riding, supra note 154.
Adler, supra note 2, at 285.
CALVIN TOMKINS, DUCHAMP: A BIOGRAPHY 181 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 427; Adler, supra note 2, at 285.

[VOL. 49: 37, 2012]

Deconceptualizing Artists’ Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

money.163 More importantly for present purposes is the fact that Duchamp
took great care with the quality of the 1964 reproductions and took great
pride that the ceramicist had used contemporaneous photos made by
Alfred Stieglitz to duplicate accurately every aspect of the 1917 Fountain.164
This is not someone to whom the destruction of art would have come
easily.
The great attraction of theories of art such as those proposed by
Professors Danto and Adler is that they promise to loosen the definition
of art and therefore broaden the scope of what may be considered art,
thus freeing the artist to pursue whatever artistic vision he or she may
have. At the very least, such theories would guarantee that never again will
a jury representing some modern equivalent of the Academie des BeauxArts reject from a major show of contemporary art the modern equivalent
of Manet’s Le déjeuner sur l’herbe because it does not conform to the
official rules governing how a painting should be painted.
But it is also possible to go too far in the other direction. There are
major risks of opening up the definition of art to include anything to
which anyone attaches that label, as Professor Adler suggests. It may seem
terribly au courant to tear down the walls that separate art from nonart,
but the practical reality is that if everything is art, then nothing is art.
While recognizing that Danto and Adler both essentially embrace the
notion that there is no longer any such thing as art, it is worthy of note
that if they really believed that, they would not revere Duchamp to the
extent that they do. They revere Duchamp precisely because he is
distinctive as an artist, and there is something in the nature of his work
that makes that work different in kind from the work product of the
many other people who have occasion to work with plumbing supplies.
Whether the definition of art—and therefore the protection of moral
rights statutes—has been expanded to include conceptual art is by now
unquestionable. However broad the definition of art has become in the
contemporary era, that definition cannot completely dispense with the visual
and expressive elements that Danto is so eager to relegate to a past age.
Art still exists, and both Professors Danto and Adler implicitly recognize
this fact through their own tastes. After all, if the situation were not so, we
would have no way of distinguishing Duchamp from Piero Cannata.

163.
164.

TOMKINS, supra note 159, at 427.
Id.

85

V. WHY BASE THE LAW ON THE RIDICULOUS WHEN THE SUBLIME IS
STILL FREELY AVAILABLE?
For all the extravagant statements about the end of art and the inevitable
workings of history, the theory of art that is implicit in Professor Adler’s
contentions about moral rights statutes is not so much a theory as it is a
special pleading in favor of one particular kind of art. Professor Adler—
and Professor Danto, on whom Professor Adler strongly relies—argues
that moral rights statutes are no longer necessary because such statutes
are intertwined with a kind of art that, in Professor Adler’s opinion, is
now dead.
[W]hen dealing with contemporary artworks . . . we must consider the
difference between what “art” means today and what it meant in the past. The
word “art” used to invoke beauty, mastery and transcendence. But postmodern
art, drawing on Dada and Pop, moved art from the realm of the beautiful,
physical, or even visual to the realm of the conceptual.165

For purposes of the current discussion, here is the capper: “Given this
move of art from the physical to the conceptual realm, the value of
preserving physical objects that artists make today is diminished.”166
This is stated very definitively, as should be expected from someone
who has witnessed the end of history. Unfortunately, rumors of its death
notwithstanding, history seems to have moved on. Indeed, history has
moved on in ways that may undercut many of Professor Adler’s art-world
arguments against moral rights statutes. Professor Adler may have wedded
her theory and her criticism of moral rights statutes to a type of art
whose assumption of dominance is becoming passé. The rumblings of a
shift away from the conceptual and back toward the visual have been
heard for some time. As far back as 2002, there was an intense row
regarding this very subject within London’s Institute of Contemporary
Arts (ICA), one of that city’s most avant-garde art institutions, and one
that is deeply committed to the conceptual art approach. The fracas was
initiated by Ivan Massow, who was at the time chairman of the Institute.
The specific cause of the dispute was an article written by Massow in
The New Statesman, in which he derided the conceptual art that had
become, in fact, “our official art.”167 Some of Massow’s complaints were
aesthetic: “Concept art is so firmly ‘established,’ it is no longer promoted
through reference to any criteria of aesthetics, originality or intellectual
challenge, but through spin and the clever exploitation of the fear of

165.
166.
167.
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‘missing out.’”168 But in a way Massow’s most biting criticism was his
description of the cultural matrix in which conceptual art thrives:
Totalitarian states have an official art, a chosen aesthetic that is authorised and
promoted at the cost of other, competing styles. . . . In Britain, too, we have an
official art—concept art—and it performs an equally valuable service. It is
endorsed by Downing Street, sponsored by big business and selected and
exhibited by cultural tsars such as the Tate’s Nicholas Serota who dominate the
arts scene from their crystal Kremlins. Together, they conspire both to protect
their mutual investments and to defend the intellectual currency they’ve
invested in this art.169

This is the most damning indictment of the current crop of conceptual art
and the artists who produce it. The most prominent contemporary
conceptual artists—including almost all of those mentioned in Professor
Adler’s article—are for the most part corporate artists, in the sense that
that they seem particularly interested in art not for its own sake but
rather as something that can be turned into a marketable commodity by
the likes of Charles Saatchi or, when it outgrows Saatchi, Sotheby’s.170
Needless to say, Ivan Massow’s article in The New Statesman got him
dismissed as the chairman of the ICA. But it turns out Massow was not the
only one to see cracks in the conceptual art phalanx. Only two years after
Massow’s article, Sarah Kent, a former gallery director of the ICA, wrote in
the same magazine that “the ICA would scarcely be missed if it closed
down tomorrow.”171 She reiterated Massow’s criticism that galleries such
as the ICA, which incessantly promoted conceptual art, made themselves
“merely stooges of an arts establishment ‘guilty of conspiring to make
concept art synonymous with contemporary art.’”172 And in the deepest
cut of all for an institution that prides itself on its avant-garde bona fides,
she noted that “its mantle of radicalism is now distinctly threadbare.”173
But none of this signaled the failure of conceptual arts to achieve its
historical destiny of supplanting the visual arts as much as a development

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. The reference in the text is to Damien Hirst’s recent decision to bypass
galleries altogether and market his work to the public directly through auction houses
such as Sotheby’s. See Colin Gleadell, Damien Hirst Skips the Middleman . . ., WALL
ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at D7 (discussing Hirst’s 2008 auction at Sotheby’s, which grossed
over $200 million).
171. Sarah Kent, Irrelevant Cautious Antique, NEW STATESMAN, Sept. 20, 2004, at
38, 38.
172. Id. at 39.
173. Id.
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that occurred only a few years later. Charles Saatchi is probably the most
important figure in the conceptual art-centered contemporary art scene.
In many ways he created that scene. After making his fortune at the
advertising firm Saatchi & Saatchi—founded with his younger brother
Maurice174—he started collecting the work of mostly American artists.
Then, in 1990, after divorcing his first wife, who was an American- born art
writer, he sold virtually the entire collection and began to pursue the art
that made him an art-world magnate: the conceptualist art-oriented YBAs,
or Young British Artists. He collected this new art with the same kind of
enthusiasm he expressed for Margaret Thatcher, whose advertising
campaign for the 1979 British elections Saatchi masterminded. A fair
number of critiques echoed this line from a glowing 1999 New York
Times profile: “After helping to revive the moribund Conservatives, he
single-handedly rehabilitated Britain’s desiccated art scene.”175
All of this fits happily within the story being told by Professors Adler
and Danto: that the visual arts, and especially painting, are dead and
have been replaced by conceptual art of the sort with which Charles Saatchi
is usually connected. Under this conception of the art world, the work of
Damien Hirst (sharks in formaldehyde), Tracey Emin (condom-festooned
dirty beds), and the Chapman brothers (clown-faced desecrated copies
of Goya and “penis-nosed, vagina-mouthed child-mannequins”176)
defines the new art world. If this story were true, then the debate about
the continuing viability of moral rights statutes at least would be a debate
about statutes that served no contemporary function but rather were mere
artifacts of a past era in art. Unfortunately for the proponents of this
story, recent developments in the art world have made this account of
the art world sound about ten years out of date. The man who allegedly
rehabilitated Britain’s desiccated art scene has either sold or put into
storage almost all of his conceptual art and turned to—of all things—
painting. In early 2005, his “Saatchi Gallery opened the first installment of
a three-part yearlong show called ‘The Triumph of Painting.’”177 As if the
show itself—as well as its title—were not enough of a finger in the eye of
the conceptual art establishment, Saatchi drove the point home with a
few pointed comments:
“People need to see some of the remarkable painting, produced and overlooked,
in an age dominated by the attention given to video, installation and
photographic art,” he said. He added, “For me, and for people with good eyes

174. See Deborah Solomon, The Collector, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 26, 1999, at 44.
175. Id. at 47.
176. Hari, supra note 144.
177. Alan Riding, A Powerful Collector Changes Course, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2005, at B9.
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who actually enjoy looking at art, nothing is as uplifting as standing before a
great painting whether it was painted in 1505 or last Tuesday.”178

As The New York Times concluded its article on the show, “[F]or the first
time in 20 years, contemporary painting is back on London’s art agenda.”179
Even in the United States, which tends to lag somewhat behind
England in the art fad tournaments, painting, which never really left the
scene to the same extent as it did in the United Kingdom, is making a
strong comeback. John Currin, for example, is one of a new generation
of younger figurative painters whose works now command high prices
and serves as an example of artistic success for artists who continue to
be interested in learning and practicing the sorts of visual technique and
artistic craft in which the conceptual artists long ago lost interest. Professor
Adler mentions Currin, but only in order to unsuccessfully attempt to
shoehorn him into the conceptual vision of art. “[P]art of the point of his
work is that he paints so masterfully after painting was pronounced dead.
Currin paints as if there were quotation marks around the word ‘painter,’
marking it off as a sly conceptual move.”180 With respect, this could be
true only if one chooses to ignore both Currin’s work and everything the
artist has ever said about his work.181 It is true that there are conceptual
aspects to Currin’s work; the work certainly has a point of view, it shares
with the conceptualists an ironic perspective toward its subjects, and
there is an element in his work—especially the early work—that seems
intended to shock its audience. But this is all encased within art that is
heavily imbued with a sophisticated visual aesthetic. Currin clearly cares
very deeply about aspects of art that are supposed to be anachronistic
in this conceptual age—things such as brushwork, color, and composition.
This aspect of Currin’s work does not comment on the proposition that
painting is dead; it disproves it. As does the rise to prominence of the
bevy of other American painters such as the young figurative artists Lisa
Yuskavage, Elizabeth Peyton, and Jenny Saville and representational
178. Id. (quoting Charles Saatchi).
179. Id.
180. Adler, supra note 2, at 293.
181. In discussing his decision to pursue the unfashionable art of figurative
painting, Currin notes that he did so in part “to stand out, to play it straight” from those
who dominated the art scene at that time. Glenn O’Brien, Interview with John Currin,
INTERVIEW MAG., http://www.interviewmagazine.com/art/john-currin/print/ (last visited
Dec. 28, 2011). He also noted that two of his significant influences were “Neue
Sachlichkeit [the New Objectivity] and Christian Schad, this German realist from the
’20s and ’30s”—hardly icons of your typical conceptual artist. Id.
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painters such as Vincent Desiderio, Bo Bartlett, Richard Maury, Odd
Nerdrum, and Wade Schuman.182
To be sure, for a time it may have appeared that conceptual art
utilizing nontraditional media such as videos, installations, assemblages,
fish tanks, and sculptural replicas of the artist and his paramour having
sex183 may have squeezed out the work of artists using traditional media
such as painting. But that is how the art world works. The art world is
faddish, clannish, ingrown, often superficial, seldom very intellectual,
and defined much more by economics than by aesthetics. When Robert
Hughes titled his history of twentieth-century art The Shock of the New,184
little did he know that he was also aptly summarizing the twenty-firstcentury art gallery marketing ploy: Shocking! New! If conceptual art
retreats from its perceived dominance, it will be because much of it had
little to offer as art—and by art, I mean an expressive medium that relies
first and foremost on the visual and the aesthetic and secondarily on an
abstract and usually obvious and trite “concept.”
The main point of this diversion into an overview of the trends in
contemporary art is to underscore that the anti-art attitudes and support
of destruction-as-art, which form the basis of Professor Adler’s attack on
moral rights statutes, are themselves components of an artistic pose. The
category of art from which that pose is drawn has become increasingly
frayed around the edges recently. It was probably impossible for conceptual
art to dominate the art scene for very long because all conceptual art is
based on easy irony, the inside joke, and a quick shock. But once the
shock wears off, and the joke has been told, it is difficult to see what
conceptual art can produce as a sequel. A friend of mine in college had
a show in which the last piece was a Kellogg’s Pop-Tart, which my friend
placed pretentiously on a stand, which in turn was placed on a linendraped table. The title of the piece was But Is It Tart? Good enough for
a chuckle, one must admit, but would anyone really go out of his or her
way to see the Pop-Tart a second time?

182. These names are chosen because they have achieved sufficient distinction to be
noticed by the mainstream press. See Mia Fineman, Talk of the Town, SLATE (Dec. 30,
2003), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/art/2003/12/talk_of_the_town.html; A Closer
Look at John Currin, SLATE, http://web.archive.org/web/20100831160419/http://www.
slate.com/id/2093020/slideshow/2093150/fs/0/entry/2093130/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
183. The reference is to Jeff Koons, who in 1991 produced a series of paintings and
sculptures titled Made in Heaven, which depicted Koons having sex with his then-wife
La Cicciolina, the Hungarian porn star and former member of the Italian parliament. See
Michael Kimmelman, Art in Review, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1991, at C28 (reviewing the
Made in Heaven show); Calvin Tomkins, Koons at Fifty, NEW YORKER, Feb. 7, 2005, at
33 (discussing the Made in Heaven show in the context of Koons’s other work).
184. ROBERT HUGHES, THE SHOCK OF THE NEW (2d ed. 1991).
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In any event, even if the conceptualist-oriented art scene were as
vibrant as it was over a decade ago, it would still raise the question why
this type of art should be used as an excuse to undermine one of the few
protections the law offers to artists who believe that art should be something
more than a pile of bricks on a museum floor.185 As noted above,186 just
as many pieces of conceptual art can be produced if moral rights statutes
stay on the books as could be produced if those statutes were rescinded
tomorrow. If, as a matter of theory, conceptual artists believe that all
art—including their own—is ephemeral and should not be allowed to
last, then there is nothing to prevent those artists from putting an expiration
date on their own work, as apparently Damien Hirst did when he used
for several of his famous installation pieces carcasses of animals that rot.187
In contrast to this perspective of art, others believe that there is art that
should be preserved and protected against destruction. It is probably true

185. The reference is to the Tate Museum’s purchase of Carl Andre’s piece
Equivalent VIII—more commonly known as “a pile of bricks.” See Archive Journeys:
Tate History, The Bricks Controversy, TATE ONLINE, http://www.tate.org.uk/archive
journeys/historyhtml/people_public.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2011) (acknowledging that
the museum was “ridiculed by many for . . . being conned into buying ‘a pile of bricks’”).
The piece consists of 120 sand-lime bricks, arranged in a rectangle on the museum floor.
See Carl Andre, Tate Collection: Equivalent VIII, TATE ONLINE, http://www.tate.org.uk/
servlet/ViewWork?workid=508 (last visited Dec. 28, 2011). The Tate piece is actually a
reproduction. Andre had no place to store the bricks after the original piece was shown
in a gallery, so he had to return them to the building supply company. When the Tate
decided to buy the piece, the original building supply company had gone out of business,
so he had to buy new bricks from another company. See CARL ANDRE, CUTS: TEXTS
1959–2004, at 47 (James Meyer ed., 2005).
186. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.
187. After Charles Saatchi sold Damien Hirst’s most famous piece to the American
hedge fund broker Steve Cohen for over six million pounds, it was revealed that the
shark that was the focal point of the piece had begun to rot. According to observers at
the time, the liquid in which the shark floated was “now murky and the shark [was]
showing considerable signs of wear and tear and ha[d] changed shape.” Nigel Reynolds,
Hirst’s Pickled Shark Is Rotting and Needs To Be Replaced. Should It Still Be Worth
6.5M?, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 28, 2006, at 5, available at 2006 WLNR
11159348. Hirst’s solution to this problem was simply to replace the old shark with a
new one, which is a gesture oddly co ntrary to the conceptual emphasis on the
impermanence of art. And apparently the problem does not stop with Hirst because the
shark incident “highlights growing alarm over how to preserve the high-priced
conceptual works, many made from organic materials, poor quality paint, junk and even
blood and insects, produced by Hirst’s Young British Artists movement.” Id. Nor does
the problem with Hirst’s work end with the shark because his other work includes
“rotting cows [arranged] to simulate copulation, . . . sheep preserved in formaldehyde
and maggots attacking a cow’s head.” Carol Vogel, Swimming with Famous Dead Sharks,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at 28.
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that one hundred years from now few people will be interested in seeing
the Chapman brothers’ clown faces. At the other end of the spectrum,
it is an equally good bet that one hundred years from now people will
still be interested in perusing Goya’s Disasters of War since that work
has already proved that it resonates with people beyond the century mark.
So if moral rights statutes, as weak as they are, prove even modestly
successful in protecting contemporary artwork that may have a similar
resonance, then these statutes are worth preserving and defending, no
matter how unpostmodern such an effort may seem.
VI. CONCLUSION
Professor Adler’s approach to art and moral rights statutes seems
better in the abstract than in practice. In the abstract, it seems like a
good idea to bring to bear on the legal protection of art relevant recent
developments in contemporary art and art theory. Also, in the hands of
people such as Professor Danto, there seems to be a very good theoretical
case to be made that the visual traditional art forms such as painting,
drawing, and sculpture have been superseded by conceptual art, whose
practitioners care little or not at all about traditional aesthetic concerns.
In practice, however, the claims of conceptual dominance over the visual
arts are overblown. The visual arts—especially painting—have witnessed a
resurgence over the past decade, and this resurgence shows no signs of
abating. Moreover, the approach to moral rights statutes that stemmed from
the focus on conceptual art has the unfortunate side effect of transferring
control over art to those whose primary interest in art is not in aesthetics
but rather in matters of commerce, religion, or politics.
No one would argue that moral rights statutes are the ultimate legal
protection of art. The federal and state statutes are narrow, there are a
number of exclusions, and for any number of reasons the statutes are
unlikely to provide the kind of protection that those who supported the
statutes hoped and expected. Nevertheless, the statutes are important, if
for no other reason than to represent the principle that the protection of
art is an important social desideratum. Abandoning the concept of moral
rights in order to reconcile the law regarding art with contemporary
artists who believe that the destruction of art is itself art makes no sense,
unless one believes in something akin to an aesthetic equivalent of the
Vietnam War adage that we must destroy the village in order to save it.
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